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NOSTALGIA FOR THE HOMOGENEOUS COMMUNITY:
KARL LARENZ AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST THEORY OF CONTRACT
1. Preliminary
In the context of the National Socialist attack on the 
foundations of liberal democratic society, Karl Larenz, with a 
bevy of other jurists, embarked on a rather ambitious endeavour: 
to reconstruct the whole of legal knowledge in anti- 
individualistic, organicist terms 1, so as to give a new basis 
not only to public law but also to the whole of private law, to 
such an extent that the "prime dichotomy" itself between public 
law and private law would cease to have meaning 2. In the 
context of the battle being waged against the figure of 
subjective right, seen as the key concept of the liberal 
conception of law 3, Larenz follows two paths. On the one hand 
is the familiar, well-delineated one of statist, formalist, legal 
positivism, with the supremacy of the State over the individual 
(the "subject, der Untertan. of which the whole of publicist 
doctrine of the Germanic cultural area speaks ”) 4. On the other
hand, our German jurist follows the path of collectivist anti­
formalism originating in the positivist philosophy and anti­
individualism that runs through a major part of the social and 
sociological theories of the later 19th century, from Comte 5to 
Durkheim, by way of Marx, in the field of theory of law reaching 
Duguit, whose merciless criticism of the concept of subjective 
right 6is echoed in more than one passage in Larenz's writing. 
The two paths of statist legal positivism and collectivist anti­
formalism meet at the point of common rejection of the natural- 
law theories regarded by both as "unscientific", or nearly so. 
The rejection of natural law was transmitted to Larenz also by 




























































































There is, however, one important difference between legal 
positivism and the sociological perspective. While the legal 
positivist tradition, though maintaining the State's supremacy 
over the individual, does not go so far as to deny the latter a 
dignity of existence and an ontological status (cancelling out 
the individual - in the extreme case of Kelsen's theory, for 
instance - only within the legal system), the social theory of 
philosophical positivism (with a few exceptions, notably Spencer) 
affirms the ontological supremacy of the collectivity over the 
individuals and not - as, say, legal positivism does - its 
normative supremacy. If legal positivist theories question the 
axiological privilege of the individual and in any case deny the 
individual the dignity of being a source of law, philosophical 
positivism (which in the overwhelming majority of its 
theoreticians was methodologically collectivist) queries the 
onotological primacy of the individual person vis-à-vis society 
8. Society is not - for this philosophy - an aggregate of 
individuals and in any case a product of them; instead the 
individual is a creature, almost an invention,- of society. And 
this, though refounded on an idealistic basis, is the theoretical 
inspiration that prevails in Larenz's theory and in general in 
the political doctrine of National Socialism. It should be 
recalled that for that doctrine - as Ernst Cassirer writes - "the 
German people is not a mixtum compositum. a mere aggregate of 
many millions of men and women. It is a homogeneous whole, a 
corpus mvsticum. a profound, mysterious unity" 9.
2. The reformulation of the legal figure of the contract
The critique of subjective right is pursued by Larenz in the name 
of the reasons of practical life against the abstractness of the 
formulas of jurists and in the name of the principle of 
solidarity that binds the members of the community against the 
selfishness and individualism of those who regard society as an 
aggregation of individual subjects among whom there is no other 
relationship than the formal one of contractual reciprocity. In 




























































































subjective right is a logical consequence of the critique of the 
bourgeois society that National Socialist doctrine regards as an 
epoch of decadence 10. Bourgeois society - on this view - 
developed on the wreck of the original, genuine bonds of 
community that resisted until the assertion of the mercantile 
economy. "This form of society," writes Larenz of bourgeois 
society, "is in reality the ruin of every human bond and civility 
I Gesittung): the State, too, here increasingly becomes the 
plaything of economic magnates and is thereby voided of its 
dignity and meaning. The law, I would say, takes part in this 
ruining of 'moral power': under the banner of 'contractual 
freedom' it increasingly becomes the 'right of those interested 
(Interessentenrecht), that is, the dictate of the economically 
strongest. It still holds only as the formal rule of play of 
economic struggles and of class, which determine the specific 
'content' of social existence; which is thereby deprived of 
formative energies, ethical content and creative goals" 11.
Contractual freedom, according to Larenz, is nothing but an 
artifice behind which there is concealed the power of the 
cleverest and the strongest: “In economic life, contractual 
freedom served those who managed to secure an advantage for 
themselves by clever calculation and the ruthless exercise of 
their economic power" 12. Thus, the ideal of the certainty of 
law is attacked, since behind it there is concealed merely the 
need for security of economic transactions. "The ideal of the 
positivist is the state of complete certainty of law, a state in 
which the legal consequences of every action can be exactly 
calculated in advance, in which the free play of economic forces 
may come about undisturbed, along the "lines" - as it is 
significantly put - of the law" 13. Our German jurist's attack 
on the related categories of subjective right and contractual 
freedom echoes themes of Marxist and socialist critique (I am 
thinking in particular of the work of Pasukanis 14), similarly 




























































































Larenz's words ring very strongly with the desire for a return 
to the mythical past of the undivided, homogeneous community, not 
yet dismembered, fragmented and made pluralist by the process of 
secularization. During the whole of the 19th century and the 
early years of the 20th, a period of time over which the 
occidental societies became definitively secular thanks to the 
parallel (but not necessarily interconnected) advance of the 
industrial and the democratic revolution, many philosophers and 
sociologists had pointed to the move from feudal society to the 
new bourgeois organization with the help of a pair of concepts 
which, though denoted by different names (status and contract in 
Maine, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in Tonnies, "military 
society" and "industrial society" in Spencer, "organic epoch" and 
"critical epoch" in Saint-Simon), always designated two identical 
social conditions: on the one hand the integrated monistic 
society of which the individual person was a function, on the 
other the conflictual, pluralist society of which the individual 
is the creator. Larenz's theory - as more generally the whole 
of National Socialist thought - can accordingly be seen as the 
attempt at the level of social organization and more specifically 
of legal organization to bring European society back in time to 
before the French revolution, to status, and to annihilate the 
modern society based on contract. "What Hegel," he writes, "saw 
coming about at the end of antiquity has been repeated in the 
19th century. The community has fallen apart, and right has thus 
been transformed into a coercive external norm. Today, however, 
National Socialism has given us the genuine community, returning 
to the original sources of the people's life" 15.
Larenz discerns in the affirmation of man as individual, that is, 
as a being endowed with value in himself and not by the fact of 
belonging to a community, the origin of the dissolution of the 
organic community and the decline of the idea of law as a 
principal inherent in the social body. "As long as the community 
awareness in a people is still immediate and intact, the 
individual feels law and custom not so much as a limit to his 




























































































existence. In such epochs the need for an exact and even written 
determination of the rights and duties of the individual is 
accordingly minimal. They remain included in the general order 
of life, the element of each one's existence. Law lives in these 
epochs in memory and in tradition and in the immediate ius 
dicere. and can scarcely be distinguished for custom. But when 
the original sense of togetherness loosens, when the individual 
begins to feel himself an individual and to counterpose his 
interests to those of the community, then the legal order appears 
before him as claim and limitation" 16. Moreover, the very 
terminology used by our German jurist is unequivocal: in counter­
position to subjective right, he speaks of Rechtsstellunq. which 
might serve as a German translation of status, and of 
Volksaemeinschaft in counter-position to the bourgeois, 
individualistic society conceived of as a work of individual 
relationships. Where he distinguishes between "convention" and 
"custom" and defines the former as "the generalized habit of a 
social group or class or of many individuals or of the formless 
"one" (des gestaltlosen "Man"1 17, and the second as "expression 
of a definite community spirit, the product and connecting link 
of a real community" 18, Larenz adds that there is the same 
difference here as between "spirit of the people", a genuine 
community spirit fGemeinqeist). and mere "collective opinion" 
(kollektives Meinen), "or simply between community (Gemeinschaft) 
and society (Gesellschaft), between living whole (Lebensqanz) and 
collective (Kollectiv)" 19.
In place of subjective right Larenz wishes to set up the 
Rechtstellunq of the Volksgenosse, which may represent and be a 
legal translation for the position of the subject in the concrete 
order of the community (the Gliedstellunq), that is, the "legal 
position" as member of the community. "The fundamental concept 
of the future private law will no longer be the person, the 
abstractly equal bearer of rights and duties, but the 
Rechstqenosse, who as member of the community has a well-defined 
position of rights and duties" 20. This is true particularly 




























































































Here the individual's power of disposal is nil. The subject 
cannot dispose, except in the most limited terms, of his own 
"position", still less of the "rights" (in the improper sense), 
the "Befuqnisse", which result from the Rechtsstelluna. This 
means in practice a return to a society in which each individual 
was indissolubly tied to his own social condition.
This theoretical reconstruction/liquidation of subjective right 
is not incompatible with maintenance of the figure of relative 
right arising from an obligatory relationship, to which Larenz 
still acknowledges usefulness as far as commercial exchanges are 
concerned. However, the content and appearance of these rights 
too are profoundly altered. Though recognized as "legal 
positions" different from those arising from a Gliedstellunq and 
hence accepted as Anspruche (the term they are traditionally 
denoted by in German doctrine), these are conceived no longer as 
the expression of an "abstract power of will" but as a concrete 
posse and licere of the Volksqenosse (and, be it noted, of him 
alone and not of any individual whatever), which result from the 
obligatory relationship, likewise remodelled as a Rechtsstellunq. 
or as a "relationship of community right" 21. "Accordingly, 
even a legal relationship like renting is not a bundle of 
individual subjective rights and duties, but a relationship of 
community right in which duties and powers limited by duty are 
organically combined" 22.
Subjective right is accordingly replaced by a legal position in 
which "rights" (claims) and duties are intimately connected. We 
are no longer facing the bourgeois model of "right" counterposed 
to duty, "complementary" to it, so that one party has only or 
principally rights and the other only or mainly duties. "In the 
obligatory right," writes another Nazi jurist, Heinrich Lange, 
"creditor and debitor stand against each other. The creditor as 
such has only rights, the debtor has only duties" 23. The 
Rechtsstellunq theorized by Larenz restores the model of medieval 
status in.which one's own right can be asserted against a certain 




























































































towards that party is accepted. Larenz replaces the 
"complementarity" of right and duty with the "reciprocity" of 
right and duty typical of feudal status 24. The Rechtsstellunq 
is, in fact, the "essence (Inbegriff) of duties and rights 
(Berechtigunqen)" 25, as well as being an "expression of the 
position as member of the community 26". According to Larenz 
the point is no longer to take part in the "unfortunate 
alternative between right and duty" 27, but to develop a unitary 
concept of subjective legal position containing in itself both 
right and duty.
Larenz attacks contract as a "universal-abstract" concept, 
seeking to replace it with a series of concrete contractual 
"types", which can no longer be subsumed under a single general 
concept of contract. "The aspiration to the construction of new, 
substantial, functional concepts is one of the essential reasons 
for the limitation (demanded by Siebert and me) of the scope of 
application of the concept of contract and the formulation of a 
series of types running from the fleeting contractual 
relationship (for instance the purchase of a packet of 
cigarettes) to the time-limited contract to the employment 
relationship, which cannot be brought under the concept of 
contract, and thence to the agreements (Einiqunqen) in family 
law" 28. Larenz asserts that he does not wish to deny private 
autonomy. This, he writes, if regarded as a "delegation by the 
community" tGemeinschaftsdelegation), or authorization 
(Ermachtiqunq) of the individual - coming from the community - 
to run the affairs that concern one is a "fundamental principle 
of the National Socialist legal order" 29. However, there is 
a decisive rejection of the equation between personal 
Selbstqestaltunq, which he regards as an irrenounceable feature 
of the legal order, and contractual autonomy.
In particular, Larenz stresses that the element of consent as the 
condition for entering a certain legal relationship is 
insufficient to make that relationship a contract. He 




























































































to call "agreements" (Einigunqen). in which the parties' consent 
is still the condition required to form the legal relationship 
but does not determine the content of the relationship. While 
in the contract consent, the will of the parties, determines the 
constitution and content of the relationship, in the so-called 
Einigunqen (above all marriage, and then adoption and the 
employment contract), consent determines only the constitution 
of the relationship, or better only the entry of those who 
consent to it into an already given position, into an "order" 
(the family, the enterprise) which is independent of that consent 
and exists irrespective of it.
There is then, in Larenz's view, one further difference between 
contracts, a category which he restricts exclusively to the 
"exchange of individual services or goods" 30, and Einigunqen. 
The former do not concern and do not bring into play the 
subject's legal position as Gliedstellunq, as position of being 
a member, but only what Larenz defines as the positions of the 
subject in relation to other subjects 31. Marriage, by 
contrast, or the employment relationship in an enterprise, 
involve the individual's very personality, assigning him a new 
position in the community, inserting and incorporating him "into 
a greater whole" (in ein qrosseres Ganze) 32.
Nonetheless, the category of contract, even within the limits of 
the “legal circulation" (Rechtsverkehr) to which it has been 
relegated, undergoes profound transformations. These are of two 
types. (a) In one aspect, private autonomy as the source of 
contractual regulation is considerably reduced and made 
conditional on authorization or the assent of the political 
authorities. "One increasingly important feature of our legal 
order," writes Larenz, "is the concurrence of personal autonomy 
and 'sovereign decision' (hoheitliche Entscheidunql" 33. (b) 
In another aspect, the contract is conceived of as a function 
that the parties play in the context of the community order and 
for its ends. The contract is conceived "today no longer as the 




























































































isolation, but in the context of the overall concrete order of 
the people and its creative function within the scope of that 
order" 34.
The sphere of application of the figure of the contract, as we 
have said, is restricted by National Socialist doctrine to the 
sphere of "legal circulation", or Rechtsverkehr■ that is, the 
circulation of goods. The latter is, then, treated as the 
"function" of the contract. "From the function of the obligatory 
contract of permitting the circulation of goods it follows that 
the obligatory relationship is not exhausted in the satisfaction 
of the opposing interest of the contracting parties by a sort of 
peace treaty, but also has the function common to the parties of 
bringing about the exchange of goods" 35. Thus, concludes Franz 
Wieacker, another Nazi jurist, there is even between contracting 
parties a community of purpose (Zweckqemeinschaft), the scope and 
intensity of which are graduated. The "community of purpose" may 
be sometimes lesser "as in buying a tube of toothpaste" 36, 
sometimes greater, up to becoming a sort of "community of 
performance" (Leistungsgameinschaft1 as in supply contracts. 
National Socialist legal thought sees the parties not as 
adversaries each tending to their own personal interest but as 
"contractual companions" (Vertraqsqenosseni 37, who by 
cooperating are aiming at securing the purposes set by the 
Volksqemeinschaft. The fundamental duties of the parties to the 
contract exist both before it is stipulated and after it is 
concluded. They take their origin not from the will of the 
parties but from the community order. Accordingly, contractual 
responsibility, in National Socialist legal doctrine, 
increasingly takes on the outlines of extra-contractual 
responsibility 38.
Even a contract whose scope of application is reduced to the 
sphere of circulation of goods does not, according to National 
Socialist doctrine, constitute a relationship that can be summed 
up as the sum of the individual services it gives rise to or 




























































































Wieacker, is instead a genuine "order" - or according to Lange 
a "unit" 39in which the element of duty prevails over that of 
right 40. This "order" or "unit", manifested chiefly in a 
series of "general clauses" or general principles (like “good 
faith", the creditor's so called Schutzpflicht. fair recompense 
for services etc.), further limits the role that the parties' 
will plays in determining the content of the contract 41.
Freedom of contract is questioned in relation to the conception 
that Larenz develops of freedom of the individual as such: "The 
freedom of all contains also the freedom of the individual, 
certainly not arbitrary freedom but the freedom of the ethical 
will aware of concrete responsibility in concrete community 
relationships" 42. Larenz is however less critical and 
destructive towards the notion of contract than towards that of 
subjective right. While the latter is eliminated and replaced 
by the figure of the Rechtsstellunq. the concept of contract is 
instead retained, albeit only with a thorough revision of its 
essential characteristics. What is forcibly stressed is on the 
one hand what would today be called the "social function" of the 
agreement between the parties, and on the other the dependency 
of the contract on the law, in a way that closely recalls 
Kelsen's theory of the contract as an individual norm 43. "The 
contracting parties," writes Larenz, "act not only as separate 
individuals but as members of the community, located within the 
community order. Their contractual settlement, to be legally 
valid, must be adapted to the general order as one of its means. 
It must be presented as the further concretization, determination 
and realization of the popular order. The 'popular order' ought 
not therefore to be represented as a rigid, fixed set of norms. 
It consists primarily only of directives, in constant need of 
specific perfecting and of implementation, through which alone 
the order is realized as a concrete form of life. Among 
instruments for the specific perfecting of the community order 
is also the contract, if regarded no longer as a relationship 




























































































The contract - on this view - is not an expression of the 
autonomy of the individual but a function of the legal order; not 
an instrument made available to the individual in order to enter 
into relationship with others associated with them and thereby 
achieve his own interests, but a mechanism that enables the norms 
of the order, to some extent always general and abstract even 
after the Deutsche Rechtserneuerunq. to become concrete and be 
applied to the specific case. "The contracting parties' own will 
thus ceases to be the sole determining factor for the contractual 
relationship. It is only the second factor alongside the will 
of the community which is the primary decisive element.... It is 
clear that the rigid opposition so far upheld between law, 
objective right on the one hand and agreement of the parties on 
the other falls.... Accordingly, the normal contract too is 
nothing other than the final link in a series of forms of 
production and realization of law, among which only the aspect 
of determination by the individual members of the community 
constitutes a different element" 45.
According to Larenz the contract is not a form of production of 
law counterposed to statute, the first being a voluntary 
agreement and the second a coercive act. The contract on this 
view constitutes an instrument for linkage and adjustment between 
positive law and social reality. The changeability and plurality 
of situations in social reality often render the instrument of 
law insufficient and its rigid regulation inadequate, instead 
requiring a mechanism of adjustment that allows the law an 
effective grip on reality. The contract is thus conceived of as 
the ultimate link in the chain of acts producing law. This 
formula immediately calls to mind the similar conception of 
Kelsen, who sees the contract as an intermediate element with an 
"individualizing function" between the law and the verdict 46. 
The analogy between Kelsen's conception and his own does not 
escape Larenz himself, who accordingly feels himself obliged to 
point out the difference between them. "What interests us here," 
writes our German jurist, "is not the establishment of a formal- 




























































































and legal business, but to grasp the concrete essence in the 
other and with the other of the life order of the whole people 
and of the particular order of the Volksgenossen in the formation 
of the concrete contractual relationship" 47.
On this view the limitations on contractual freedom take on a 
quite different meaning. They are no longer exceptions to the 
principle of contractual freedom but applications of the 
principle of the relativity of such freedom and its foundation 
in the community order. "The limitations set on the parties' 
freedom of determination are accordingly to be understood not as 
exceptions to the principles of contractual freedom but as 
consequences of the dependence on the community, inherent from 
the outset in a contract between Volksgenossen, and of the 
resulting principle of the relativity of the freedom of 
determination" 48.
Unfortunately, Larenz admits, one cannot do without a certain 
dose of freedom of initiative for the subject. "National 
Socialism does not eliminate the will, the initiative, of the 
individual Volksgenosse: it expects responsibility from him, and 
must accordingly allow him a certain dose of genuine freedom of 
determination, bound by duty" 49. Some form of agreement 
between subjects, some form of contractual practice, must persist 
even after the Deutsche Rechtserneuerung. "The contract, the 
free agreement between members of the national community, is 
accordingly a legal construction that even National Socialism, 
in accordance with its nature, can never completely do without" 
50.
However, on this view, one cannot assert the existence of a 
private sphere that escapes the direct interest of the community: 
what natural-law theoreticians defined as the scope of the 
"licit" or of the "legally irrelevant". Every human action is, 
on Larenz's view, of legal (as being of community or social) 
relevance. "It is accordingly not correct to explain the fact 




























































































determination in his own legal affairs by pointing solely to the 
fact that the community has no immediate interest in such 
affairs. This is certainly true in many aspects, and over and 
above this it is the very responsibility required and expected 
by National Socialism of the acting personality that renders 
necessary the granting of a certain liberty of determination and 
of disposition" 51.
3. From contract to "status". A new feudalism?
The sharpest attack on the "old" private law and the whole 
liberal legal order is brought to bear by Larenz not through 
reformulation of the legal concept of contract but through the 
restructuring of the legal figure that lies behind the concept 
of subjective right: legal capacity 52. As we know, in legal 
systems of Enlightenment inspiration, be they still absolutist 
or already liberal, legal capacity is the particular form of 
legal subjectivity that lies in the capacity to be a bearer of 
rights, attributed to each human being in virtue of his very 
existence. The formulation given by the Austrian Civil Code is 
exemplary in this connection. Article 16 of the ABGB states: 
"Jeder Mensch hat angeborene, schon durch die Vernunft 
einleuchtende Rechte, und ist daher als eine Person zu 
betrachen...".
From the fact that legal capacity results solely from the 
existence of the human subject there derives as a corollary that 
it is attributed to all humans, without distinction of class, 
race, sex, religion or political conviction. The concept of 
legal capacity is the legal figure that reflects at the level of 
the positive legal order the principle of equality understood as 
the equal dignity of all human beings before the law 53. This 
emerges explicitly from Article 11 of the Swiss Civil Code, which 
in its formulation links equality among human beings with legal 
capacity: "Every human being has civil rights. Everyone 
accordingly has, within the limits of the legal order, an equal 




























































































liberal concept of legal capacity and the principle of equality 
is well grasped by Larenz. "Dogmatics has to date," writes our 
German jurist, "considered the person as the possible bearer of 
rights and duties, and has thus identified the personality in the 
legal sense with legal capacity. It assumes as natural the fact 
that every human being as such, without regard to nationality or 
other requirements, is a person and hence legally capable. As 
persons, or in relation to the possibility of having rights, all 
human beings appear to it as equal. Accordingly, it does not in 
general recognize even degrees or gradations in legal capacity; 
instead it explicitly declares: 'The legal capacity of human 
beings is in principle equal'. In this way the idea of equality 
is revealed as the ideological a priori of the abstract concept 
of person" 54.
In the Nazi critique of liberal thought, the principle of 
equality is seen as a derivative of the principle of individual 
freedom and of individualism. And not wrongly. Once the 
individual is conceived of as an ontologically free subject, 
autonomous and "legally capable", that is, free, autonomous and 
"legally capable" of itself, by its very nature, prior to any 
legal recognition by the State or by "membership" in a particular 
social body, freedom ceases to be a "privilege" and becomes an 
intrinsic quality of the individual, as such attributed to all 
individuals, who in this respect become equal among themselves. 
This comes out well in the following statement by Heinrich Lange: 
"Equality was the undesired consequence of the freedom of the 
other, of the lack of bonds on each" 55. Previously, Eugen 
Ehrlich had stressed that "individualism in law means above all 
that the law asserts each person to be an individual, not merely 
a member of a group of people" 56and that "under the dominion 
of individualism it is not just the individual that is recognized 
as having legal capacity, but every individual" 57.
Gino Gorla, in a study on Tocqueville and the "idea of rights", 
distinguishes three conceptions of subjective rights: (a) the 




























































































determination in his own legal affairs by pointing solely to the 
fact that the community has no immediate interest in such 
affairs. This is certainly true in many aspects, and over and 
above this it is the very responsibility required and expected 
by National Socialism of the acting personality that renders 
necessary the granting of a certain liberty of determination and 
of disposition" 51.
3. From contract to "status". A new feudalism?
The sharpest attack on the "old" private law and the whole 
liberal legal order is brought to bear by Larenz not through 
reformulation of the legal concept of contract but through the 
restructuring of the legal figure that lies behind the concept 
of subjective right: legal capacity 52. As we know, in legal 
systems of Enlightenment inspiration, be they still absolutist 
or already liberal, legal capacity is the particular form of 
legal subjectivity that lies in the capacity to be a bearer of 
rights, attributed to each human being in virtue of his very 
existence. The formulation given by the Austrian Civil Code is 
exemplary in this connection. Article 16 of the ABGB states: 
"Jeder Mensch hat angeborene, schon durch die Vernunft 
einleuchtende Rechte, und ist daher als eine Person zu 
betrachen...".
From the fact that legal capacity results solely from the 
existence of the human subject there derives as a corollary that 
it is attributed to all humans, without distinction of class, 
race, sex, religion or political conviction. The concept of 
legal capacity is the legal figure that reflects at the level of 
the positive legal order the principle of equality understood as 
the equal dignity of all human beings before the law 53. This 
emerges explicitly from Article 11 of the Swiss Civil Code, which 
in its formulation links equality among human beings with legal 
capacity: "Every human being has civil rights. Everyone 
accordingly has, within the limits of the legal order, an equal 




























































































liberal concept of legal capacity and the principle of equality 
is well grasped by Larenz. "Dogmatics has to date," writes our 
German jurist, "considered the person as the possible bearer of 
rights and duties, and has thus identified the personality in the 
legal sense with legal capacity. It assumes as natural the fact 
that every human being as such, without regard to nationality or 
other requirements, is a person and hence legally capable. As 
persons, or in relation to the possibility of having rights, all 
human beings appear to it as equal. Accordingly, it does not in 
general recognize even degrees or gradations in legal capacity; 
instead it explicitly declares: 'The legal capacity of human 
beings is in principle equal'. In this way the idea of equality 
is revealed as the ideological a priori of the abstract concept 
of person" 54.
In the Nazi critique of liberal thought, the principle of 
equality is seen as a derivative of the principle of individual 
freedom and of individualism. And not wrongly. Once the 
individual is conceived of as an ontologically free subject, 
autonomous and "legally capable”, that is, free, autonomous and 
"legally capable" of itself, by its very nature, prior to any 
legal recognition by the State or by "membership" in a particular 
social body, freedom ceases to be a "privilege" and becomes an 
intrinsic quality of the individual, as such attributed to all 
individuals, who in this respect become equal among themselves. 
This, comes out well in the following statement by Heinrich Lange: 
"Equality was the undesired consequence of the freedom of the 
other, of the lack of bonds on each" 55. Previously, Eugen 
Ehrlich had stressed that "individualism in law means above all 
that the law asserts each person to be an individual, not merely 
a member of a group of people" 56and that "under the dominion 
of individualism it is not just the individual that is recognized 
as having legal capacity, but every individual" 57.
Gino Gorla, in a study on Tocqueville and the "idea of rights", 
distinguishes three conceptions of subjective rights: (a) the 




























































































the statist conception. On the first view, an example of which 
can be found in Edmund Burke's "Reflections on the French 
Revolution", subjective right is the hereditary privilege of 
particular subjects in virtue of certain of their qualities (in 
general their membership in a certain social group, a certain 
class (nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie), or a certain city or 
region. On this conception "the subjective right, the 
personality, were understood as a conquest and a product of the 
particular history of each" 58. "Here" continues Gorla, "it is 
not abstractly to man, by nature or reason, that rights and 
personality are attributed, but to whoever as man or group has 
personality and rights rooted in their own history, their own 
tradition, their own activity and that of those like them" 59. 
The "aristocratic" conception of rights is accordingly based on 
the assumption and acceptance of the inequality of men and of 
their classification and arrangement in social hierarchies and 
ranks.
The natural-law conception of rights starts from the postulate 
of the fundamental equality of human beings. This conception is 
presented by Gorla as follows: "Man, not this or that particular 
man, not this or that particular group, association or moral 
entity because of its history or traditions...; man has a right, 
a power of will, a personality that are original and innate. All 
men are equal and all, by nature and by reason, have innate 
subjective right" 60. The statist conception is instead the one 
that asserts the derivation of subjective right from the power 
of the State. The subjective right is no longer, on this 
conception, an original right (as in the aristocratic and 
natural-law conceptions), but is derived 61, a "reflected right" 
62. What interests us here, though, is the difference between 
the "aristocratic" and the "natural law" conception. Legal 
capacity, as the capacity of all men to be bearers of rights and 
duties, represents, and renders operative at legal and 
institutional level, what Gorla defines as the natural-law 
conception or "feeling" of right. "Legal capacity" is a 




























































































because it asserts the original nature of rights (since feudal 
privilege too was conceived as original) as because it roots this 
originality in the equal nature of human beings (and therefore 
has as a postulate equality among men). Accordingly, Larenz 
criticizes the modern notion of legal capacity - which posits the 
equivalence between human being and legal subject - precisely 
because this notion is the object of a conception that postulates 
the natural equality of all human beings.
Larenz denies that all men are subjects of full right, "persons". 
It is instead, in his view, only the members of the folk 
community, the so-called Volksqenossen, that are truly "persons”. 
"The core of the National Socialist renewal of law," writes 
Larenz, "lies in the overcoming of the idea of equality by the 
principle of the folk community determined by race" 63. Larenz 
does not however go so far as completely to deny the capacity to 
the foreigner, who does not belong to the folk community, 
confining himself to asserting that this latter capacity is a 
capacity of lower degree, and dependent by comparison with that 
of the Volksaenosse. "It is not 'every human being' who is 
legally capable as a person, but only the Volksqenosse as 
'Rechtsgenosse'. As a guest, the foreigner enjoys derived, 
limited legal capacity" 64. However, in order to enjoy this 
reduced capacity, the foreigner must not belong to a race foreign 
to and remote from the Germanic one, that is, must not be 
artfremd 65. But what is the connecting link between being a 
Volksqenosse and being a Rechtsgenosse? The link between the two 
qualities derives from a concept that is as vague and mythical 
as it is laden with obscure and already then terrible 
implications: "honour" 66. It is honour that makes the 
community member a subject of law in full title.
After having denied the prime characteristic of legal 
subjectivity typical of liberal legal systems (legal capacity), 
namely its attribution by birth to all human beings, Larenz turns 
against its second component. In liberal systems, as we know, 




























































































opposed and refuted by the National Socialist jurist, who lays 
down a necessary nexus between the fact that legal capacity is 
conceived of as due by birth to all men and hence equal for all 
and the fact that it consists chiefly in the possibility of being 
a bearer of subjective right. This nexus is for him no less 
purely ideological. "With the assertion, entirely devoid of 
meaning, that legal capacity is the capacity to have any right 
and duty whatever and that in this sense legal capacity of all 
men is 'in principle the same’, there is nothing but concealment 
of the essential basis of the differences in favour of an idea 
of equality whose political and spiritual origin goes clearly 
back to the thought of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution" 67. According to Larenz the capacity of being a 
member of the Volksqemeinschaft is no longer the capacity to have 
and to exercise rights, but that to "take part" in the life of 
the folk community. "Legal capacity does not mean the capacity 
to possess subjective rights, but the capacity to participate in 
the legal life of the community and in particular positions as 
member within the folk community" 68.
Furthermore, the traditional concept (of Enlightenment origin) 
of legal capacity, as well as being rooted in merely being human 
and consisting chiefly in being a bearer of subjective right, is 
disputed as such, as being an abstract legal concept. Legal 
capacity should instead be transformed into "capacity to possess 
legal positions" and hence into "a concrete concept, full of 
content" 69. Larenz, referring also to the work of another Nazi 
jurist, Karl Michaelis 70, enumerates a series of "aspects" that 
as a whole constitute legal capacity. These are firstly (a) 
protection of the personality (Personlichkeitsschutz). that is, 
"the legal recognition of the personality in its typical 
manifestations by the community" 71. This recognition includes 
in the first place the right to one's name and to personal 
honour, the so-called most personal rights, among which the 
German jurist also enumerates the right to self-defence. Then 
comes (b) the patrimonial capacity, that is, "recognition of an 




























































































the community, of participation in the common heritage of the 
nation". "The patrimonial capacity of the individual too," adds 
Larenz "is based, and this is something often overlooked, on the 
position within the community (or in relation to our community) 
and may therefore undergo limitations in the case of a foreigner 
or of someone alien to the race (Rassefrerod), whose legal 
capacity is in any case reduced by comparison with that of a 
member in full right" 72. Thirdly, legal capacity includes (c) 
procedural capacity. Fourthly comes (d) connubium. that is, the 
right to contract matrimony "within the community of the race"; 
then (e) political capacity, that is, the capacity to hold public 
office and in general to be part of the political community. 
Finally, (f) come the special capacities conditioned by 
particular prerequisites, such as, for instance, the capacity to 
be a farmer.
All these six aspects, taken individually, sanction a sort of 
hierarchy or scale of differing capacities, from a minimum to a 
maximum, from the extremely reduced capacity of someone "alien 
to the race" up to the full capacity of the Volksqenosse. If a 
general and abstract concept of capacity were adopted, like that 
in traditional private law, this gradation and 
hierarchicalization would prove impossible. In that case, legal 
capacities, characterized by a few formal common features, would 
of necessity have to be conceived of as equal for all and the 
only alternative that would remain open would be that of having 
or not having legal capacity. Larenz instead intends forcibly 
to affirm the inequality of human beings working and operating 
within the folk community and to transfer this onto the level of 
law without having to deny anyone some share of capacity. A 
negation of this type would in fact, apart from raising a series 
of irresoluble theoretical paradoxes, clash with the consolidated 
practice of relationships between associates and threaten the 
operation of the most elementary social mechanisms (one need 
think only of transactions of an economic nature) . “The 
individual member of the legal community (Rechtsgenosse) is not, 




























































































instead has a definite legal capacity which may be further 
characterized by the presence or absence of some of the aforesaid 
features. From the broad legal capacity of the member in full 
right (citizen) we may accordingly distinguish the diminished 
capacity of 'those who are about to become a member in full 
right' (des "werdenden Vollqenossen"), that of the foreigner who 
does not belong to the political community (foreign to the State) 
but not foreign to the race, and finally that of one who is alien 
to the race (die des Rassefremden) . One lacks only political 
capacity, the other also connubium. the possibility of being a 
farmer etc.) 73.
Legal subjectivity, in National Socialist doctrine, is no longer 
the "legal capacity" of liberal systems, which may give rise to 
the possibility of bearing indefinite and theoreticallly infinite 
subjective rights that may pursue multiple goals. Legal 
capacity, according to the legal doctrine that has dominated 
since the Enlightenment revolution, is in fact, as Ulrich K. 
Preuss writes, "the universal capacity of a subject to have 
rights, irrespective of whether the subject is also in a position 
to exercise those rights" 74. Legal subjectivity and being a 
bearer of the legal position (subjective right) remain quite 
distinct in the configuration given to legal subjectivity through 
the concept of "legal capacity" 75. "Legal capacity," writes 
Preuss again, "includes all the social qualifications that may 
be the object of rights" 76. The concept of "legal capacity" 
is moreover inseparably linked with that of subjective right. 
Legal capacity is the capacity to be a bearer of subjective 
rights. And the figure of subjective right is an extension onto 
the plane of legal concepts of the philosophical conception that 
the individual is an autonomous moral subject (a "person" in the 
Kantian sense). Subjective right marks the attribution to this 
subject of a sphere of action of his exclusive competence, which 
it will then be for the subject himself to fill with content in 




























































































According to Larenz, the abstract concept of person no longer has 
any meaning within the community set up in conformity with the 
principles of National Socialism, is not a legal figure operating 
within the sphere of "community right”. It can have at most 
historical value. "The concept of abstract person, which, as 
Hegel understood it, remains important as the principle of a 
different historical formation - that is, the late-Roman private 
law understood individualistically and its reception in the 
'Pandect system' of the 19th century - but has become unjustified 
for folk law in the proper sense" 77. The meaning of the 
concept of person is regarded as purely historical, in reference 
to the institutional structure and legal thought of the bourgeois 
epoch: "It retains its significance as a particular degree of the 
development of the idea of law, considered from historical and 
philosophical points of view" 78. Equally, if some significance 
is to be attributed to subjective right, this will, according to 
Larenz, be only a historical significance, testifying to a social 
and legal reality that is henceforth "overtaken". "The concept 
of subjective right," writes the German jurist, "in its present 
form goes back to the ideology and legal philosophy of early 
liberalism. At the centre of that thought was the idea of the 
human being as a morally free person. According to this 
philosophy the law exists only for the purpose of this moral 
freedom of the individual human being; the most vigorous 
expression of this freedom was, according to that philosophy, 
just this subjective right of the individual. This is the 
immediate expression of the autonomy of will, egocentrism and 
self-sufficiency of the individual, which is accordingly an end 
in itself" 79. In a society like the National Socialist one 
that sacrifices individuals on the altar of the community and the 
sacred will of the Fiihrer, subjective right can be nothing more 
than a museum artifact, ceasing to be one of the concepts through 
which the members of the society think and guide their actions.
Subjective right allows the subject to have a freedom of movement 
and hence a possibility of exchanges and relationships which 




























































































the legal form itself already expresses a particular, specific 
social condition (membership in a certain social stratum, a 
certain profession, a certain family, a certain geographical 
area) and does not refer for this purpose to the free 
determination of the subject 80. It is in this sense, but only 
in this one, that the Marxist analysis is correct in linking 
subjective right to the bourgeois requirement of market freedom 
81. Subjective right, as a general concept (that is, one that 
may be applied to the generality of social situations in which 
the subject may find himself), and an absolute one (that is, not 
"relative", as being not capable of gradation or reducible to 
arbitrary decision by the legal order, not conditioned in legal 
form by its own object, and hence "predictable" in application) 
is also this: the function of a certain economic system. But it 
does not have its roots in being a function of that system; that 
is, it is a consequence not a cause. For subjective right, and 
in general for many legal concepts, there applies what Susanne 
K.Lange wrote in connection with the vocal and linguistic play 
of children and the rites of primitive society, and in general 
for all cultural forms of any society whatever. They cannot be 
explained, or not fully or chiefly, by their apparent or presumed 
practical end 82. This is true, in my view, of all important 
social concepts (practical concepts) that is, for those concepts 
the members of society conceive of (and guide) their conduct by, 
and in part for the theoretical concepts (that is, the concepts 
through which they describe the state of affairs) 83. .
The roots of the concept of subjective right are not "functional" 
but "symbolic": they lie in the conception of the world developed 
by liberal democratic thought. "The appearance of the idea of 
subjective right," writes Helmut Coing, "is... the expression of 
a social philosophy that sees in the autonomy of the individual 
and its protection the essential purpose of the social order" 
84. Larenz is well aware of the eminently symbolic nature of 
rights. Nor are they mere legal categories that are functional 
for the systematic needs of the dogmatic and the practical 




























































































National Socialist legal order cannot, on pain of contradicting 
itself, retain this category. "This is not," writes Larenz in 
connection with the concept of subjective right, "as more than 
one person might think, an innocuous 'systematic concept' that 
might calmly be retained with the due limitations and adaptations 
to the new legal ideas, without having to fear drawbacks from 
that. Instead, we have to do here with a category which is 
thoroughly rooted in a particular conception of the world" 85.
The rejection of the universality and abstractness of the 
concepts of "legal capacity" and "subjective right" is rooted in 
Larenz's doctrine in a general rejection of universal and 
abstract concepts 86and of the vision of law as a system of 
general and abstract norms, regarded, not wrongly, as a product 
of the Enlightenment and of liberal thought. This way of 
thinking, in abstract concepts, is traced back by Larenz to the 
tradition of Roman law, regarded as essentially foreign to the 
structure and principles of "Germanic law" 87. "What we have 
to overcome in Roman law," writes Larenz, "because it threatens 
our very existence, is not so much individual propositions that 
we have taken over and may in part retain without harm, as the 
overall spiritual content it contains within it and the mode of 
thought in which it has been passed down to us. Contributing 
towards the overcoming of both is today the task not only of the 
legislator but also of German legal science. Since the structure 
of Germanic law is different from that of Roman law, it requires 
particular concrete concepts in the place of abstract universal 
concepts, and requires dialectic thought directed towards the 
totality" 88.
In the place of the autonomy and freedom of movement made 
possible by subjective right, since through it it is possible to 
attribute to the subject a normative competence in relation to 
everything that concerns the individual (this too a general and 
abstract concept), Larenz, as we have already been able to see, 
sets the "legal position" of being a member of the community, the 




























































































This Rechtsstellunq is related to a certain definite field of 
action of the individual subject, not to all its possible fields 
of action. Instead of the individual. a general and abstract 
figure which accordingly allows infinite variations in its 
concrete manifestation, there is the Volksoenosse. the member of 
a certain social class, a certain profession, a certain family, 
the centre of the "new" legal order advocated by Larenz, or 
better the new centre to which to attribute legal subjectivity 
in the context of the Volksoemeinschaft. "The Volksoenosse. like 
the Rechtsoenosse. is not the bearer of subjective rights, but 
is found in particular legal positions and accordingly in law" 
89.
The concrete person underlying the figure of "community member" 
is, on this concept, intimately bound up with the particular 
sphere of his activity which is termed legal (being a farmer, a 
father and guardian, a tenant, landlord etc.). In reality here 
it is not so much activities (which as such may theoretically be 
carried out by any subject whatever) as personal qualities of the 
subject that do not depend (as would be the case for beginning 
an "activity") on the will of the subject but are instead 
transmitted by natural means or impinge upon it by "destiny". 
The farmer, for instance, in Larenz's doctrine, is a subject of 
law not as being a human being but as being a farmer, and as a 
farmer, not inasmuch as exercising the activity of a farmer but 
as being by birth the son and heir of farmers. The condition of 
being a farmer expressed his "place" within the community" (his 
quality of being a Volksoenosse) and is a reflection of his legal 
dignity (his quality of being a Rechtsoenosse). "The farmer," 
writes Larenz, "is not the abstract person of private law, but 
only the bearer of authorization (berechtiotl as a member and in 
a certain sense as trustee of his kindred and of the whole folk 
community" 90. The "legal position" is defined as "the place 
within the community"; it is a status.
While Larenz does not employ the term status in defining the 




























































































Wolfgang Siebert by contrast explicitly refers to the concept of 
status. He is one of the Nazi jurists closest to Larenz's 
theories. Siebert too, like Larenz, reformulates the figure of 
legal subjectivity by rejecting the concept of "legal capacity" 
developed in traditional doctrine. Thus, the legal capacity of 
the Volksoenosse. according to Siebert, "is not the abstract 
capacity to have rights or duties, but the capacity to take part 
in the legal life of the people" 91. More important and 
relevant than mere capacity is instead, Siebert writes, the 
realization of this capacity in the respective "legal positions" 
of the "folk comrades" (Volksqenossen)■ "This legal position," 
he continues, "appears as status. as an integral life 
relationship and as a position as member concretely formed in the 
community and in its most restricted units and particular 
spheres" 92. Siebert, that is, explicitly asserts the 
equivalence of the concepts of Rechtsstellunq and of status■
Status in the sense discussed here, that is in the meaning that 
the term takes on as equivalent to the "legal position" theorized 
by Larenz, can be distinguished from the status spoken of by 
Georg Jellinek in his System der offentlichen subiektiven Rechte. 
In Jellinek's theory status (here translated not as Rechsstellunq 
but as Zustand) designates the relation the human being is in 
vis-à-vis the State, a primarily formal relationship at legal 
level, rather than material at social level. "The possible 
relationships in which he may be in relation to the State places 
him in a series of states (Zustànde 1 of legal relevance" 93. 
This "state" [status] or formal condition founds the subject's 
rights vis-à-vis the State. "The claims (Anspruche) that result 
from these states are what is called subjective public rights" 
94. To the various "states" (or statuses), explicitly defined 
as legal (rechtliche Zustànde 95), there correspond, in 
Jellinek's theory, different types of right. Here, accordingly, 
status and subjective right are counterposed or mutually 
exclusive, but the former is taken as the basis for the second, 
Larenz's conception is different; for him status (Rechtsstellunq) 




























































































State but the condition of the individual within the social 
organism (the Volksqemeinschaft). not the degree of greater or 
lesser freedom of the subject but his function, origin and work 
in the context of the community. While in Jellinek's theory 
status (Zustand) is a situation that necessarily refers to 
another subjective legal situation, the right of the individual, 
in Larenz's theory status (Rechtsstellunq) is the only subjective 
legal situation. In his doctrine status is a subjective legal 
situation that differs from and is counterposed to subjective 
right. While in Jellinek status and subjective right are fully 
compatible situations and indeed intimately connected, in Larenz 
we find that "antinomy of subjective right and status (statut)" 
that Georges Renard speaks of 96.
Subjective right and status fRechtsstellunq in Larenz, statut in 
Renard) are counterposed without being mutually exclusive within 
one and the same legal system (in Renard's moderate theory) or 
are mutually exclusive (in Larenz's extremist version) for three 
chief reasons. 1) Status is not a general requisite of all human 
beings but an attribute of the members of a particular community 
("institution", says Renard). Or, "subjective right is the 
radiation of the personality, status is the reflection of the 
institution" 97. 2) Status is not an abstract legal situation 
that is made specific (filled with content) only following 
exercise of the subject's will: on the contrary it already 
expresses one, and only one, definite concrete possibility of 
action by the latter. Or, "status is the consequence of an 
arrangement of things of which I am not the master; it is a 
position that I occupy" 98. Accordingly, by contrast with 
subjective right, status is neither disposable nor transmissible. 
"Subjective right is disposable: the bearer of the right may 
renounce it, sell it or give it away. Status is non-cessible, 
inalienable; it cannot be renounced" 99. 3) Status is not 
always equal to itself, absolute, but may diversify, graduate, 
hierarchicalize, reduce or expand its own limits, in a word, is 
relative■ Or, "status participates in the mobility of the 




























































































constituted, challenges events; status follows the fate of the 
institution; it day by day adapts to its ups and downs" 100.
In another sense we may speak of status in relation to the 
configuration of the subjective legal position delineated by 
Larenz and by National Socialist legal doctrine. Status, 
understood as the subjective legal position typical of the feudal 
order, is characterized in its internal structure by the link it 
sets up between the exercise of a right and subjection to a duty 
101. This connection, whereby assertion of a claim against a 
party is at the same time subjection to a duty towards that party 
so that that right can be asserted inasmuch as one has taken on 
that duty, may also be rendered, according to Niklas Luhmann, by 
the notion of "reciprocity", counterposed to that of 
"complementarity", between rights and duties 102. In status, 
according to Luhmann, rights and duties are "reciprocal", in the 
sense that one is possessed on condition of also having the 
other. Status is accordingly a set of rights and duties accruing 
to the same subject. This definition of status sticks closely 
to the definition of Rechtsstellunq given by Larenz: an 
Inbeqriff von Rechten und Pflichten. Being a bearer of and 
exercising subjective right is instead not conditioned by any 
duty to which the bearer of the right must submit. Duty is here, 
as Luhmann writes, "complementary" to subjective right. The duty 
corresponding to the subjective right bears upon a different 
subject from the bearer of the right, and characterizes the legal 
position of the person on whom it (the duty) bears as a "passive 
situation" by comparison with the "active" one of the bearer of 
subjective rights. In the bourgeois legal order, as Heinrich 
Lange, another front-rank Nazi jurist, writes, the creditor is 
characterized as a subject that has only rights and the debtor 
as one that has only duties 103.
The concept of status is bound up with that of "a state", of 
"class", in the feudal sense, of Stand, to which one belongs 
purely by birth and from which one cannot become emancipated 




























































































feudal order is not merely implicit but deliberate. This can be 
seen from the architecture of the "new" legal order, as sketched 
out by our German jurist. From the subjective viewpoint, as far 
as the individual's position is concerned, there is no longer 
anything but a Gliedstellunq. and a "personality conditioned by 
the community and the race ( art- und qemeinschaftsbedinqte 
Personlichkeit)" 105. From an objective viewpoint, as far as 
the structure of the folk community is concerned, it is conceived 
as an organic agglomerate of Gliedstellunqen. that is, as a 
standische Lebensordnunq, an order of estates. The Gliedstellunq 
is given once and for all: the subject cannot change it; it is 
expressed by a "bound legal position", a qebundene 
Rechtsstellunq. The individual claims arising from this status 
or "legal position" cannot be distinguished or detached from the 
status itself. That is, not only can the status not be disposed 
of, but nor can the individual "rights" (in the improper sense), 
that is, the powers and competences (Befuqnissel that derive from 
it. "The legal positions in which a position as community member 
are expressed (like the position of farmer or parental power) 
represent a task assigned by the community; duty and power here 
are the same thing. There cannot be disposition either of the 
legal position or of the individual power" 106. In the system 
Larenz is presenting the legal relationships run exclusively 
through the interplay of status and of Stande.
In bourgeois society the legal subject is an abstract, free 
subject, that is, formally emancipated from a determined social 
condition: the personal individual and the individual as member 
of an estate or class not longer coincide. Marx writes in this 
connection that in feudal society, "for instance, a noble always 
remains a noble, a roturier always a roturier. irrespective of 
any other condition they may have; this is a quality inseparable 
from their individuality. The difference between the personal 
individual and the individual as member of a class, casuality as 
the condition of life for the individual, arises only with the 
appearance of the class which in turn is a product of the 




























































































peasant disposes of and enjoys his piece of land not as a 
peasant, but as a human being who bears a property right, and is 
accordingly free to divest himself of his condition as farmer 
(which is not legally relevant for the purposes of possession and 
of exercise of the right of ownership) by selling or renting out 
his land, that is, disposing of his right. He is equally free 
to take on the condition of, let us say, baker by buying the 
necessary equipment or selling his labour services, that is, 
again by buying or ceding rights. This freedom is not fictional 
or merely ideological, as a part of the socialist and Marxist 
critique has been asserting for over a century now 108, but 
real. The farmer can in fact change occupation, residence and 
class. He can move between different places and social 
positions. This freedom does not imply equality of conditions, 
but only the possibility of taking on different conditions. Nor 
does this freedom imply the possibility of improving an 
individual's conditions of life, but only of changing them. It 
implies horizontal social mobility, between social conditions at 
the same level of wealth, and not necessarily also vertical, 
between social conditions at different levels of wealth. It is 
against this freedom, against social mobility tout court. that 
the attack of National Socialist lawyers is directed 109.
They rail against freedom of movement and change within the 
social body and against those legal mechanisms introduced by 
bourgeois society to promote that mobility: consider the 
bourgeois battle against entails in favour of freedom of 
testament. Freedom of testament is attacked by Nazi legal theory 
along the lines on which it attacked legal capacity: on the one 
hand against the freedom to dispose (principle of autonomy), or 
against the power of the individual to himself decide the norms 
governing his conduct, in particular the norms regarding the 
destination to give his own property after his death; on the 
other against the generality of disposition, that is, against the 
possibility of disposing of all one's property (the principle of 
universal succession), that is, against the possibility of 




























































































corresponding to the generality and abstractness of the legal 
subject. The inheritance, as was already the case with the legal 
subject, becomes distinguished and fragmented into a sum of 
particular elements. These particular elements (goods) are 
classified in different categories and these in turn ordered 
according to a hierarchical criterion. To the greater or lesser 
closeness of the individual asset to the community order, the 
greater or lesser link of the asset with the "blood" and "soil" 
of the Volksqemeinschaft, will correspond a greater or lesser 
disposability of it 110.
"Since legal transactions are possible not alongside but only 
within the folk community order," Larenz writes, "it has as its 
prerequisite the particular systems and articulations of the 
people's life. Thus, for instance, property has its foundation 
in the family and in the order of estates (Ordnunq der Standee, 
and belongs to legal circulation only to the extent to which it 
is alienable or can be violated. From the family Oder as the 
prime order of existence that decisively determines the life of 
the child there also follows the discipline of transactional 
capacity, from the personal requirement to act in legal 
circulation 111." The proposal to go backwards towards feudal 
society is explicit in Larenz when he writes that "the German 
idea of law is destined in the next historical epoch to replace 
that of the French Revolution" 112. And in what, according to 
Larenz, did the idea of law introduced by the French Revolution 
consist? In the "elimination of all differences of estate, sex, 
race and religion" 113. The task of the "German idea of law" 
will, contrary to what the "abstract" individualism that emerged 
from natural-law rationalism and liberalism had done, be to 
restore the social differences and replace the co-existence of 
equals with the immediate 114and organic union of the members 
of an ethically homogeneous or "pure" body.
4. The "overcoming" of the division between public law and





























































































Reformulation of the category of 
the subjective legal position and of the figure of the contract 
by National Socialist legal doctrine culminated in its 
abandonment of the division between private law and public law
115.
The distinction between ius 
privatum and ius publicum is traditionally founded on the 
different type of interest that is the object of the protection 
offered by each type of law. While in private law the interest 
and utility of the individual take prominence and are protected 
as such, in public law it is the interest of society as a whole 
that takes the upper hand and constitutes the reference point for 
legal regulation 116. Moreover, private law takes into 
consideration the legal relationships between individuals and 
assumes a notion of legal duty that is articulated between 
private subjects, the performance of which is entrusted to the 
decision of the private person. "Private law," writes Karl 
Larenz in this connection, "in the sense adopted hitherto intends 
to regulate relationships of individual persons with other 
individuals. It knows legal duties only as duties of the one 
towards the other, towards the bearer of the advantaged position, 
and regularly refers to the latter in order to assert these 
duties by the request for performance or for compensation for 
damage. The individual's duties towards the collectivity 
(Gesamtheiti are instead confined to public law" 117. 
Traditional private law is seen as an autonomous system of legal 
relationships between individuals. This also means that the 
system of private law is constructed dogmatically on the basis 
of presumptions of its own, and can be understood and explained 
only by reference to these.
Larenz rejects this construction 
of private law as the sphere of legal relationships among 
individuals because "any such autonomous system as private law 
can no longer be reconciled with out people's order of life (mit 




























































































on three chief reasons. (a) Firstly, private law as a system 
clearly distinct from public law sanctions the existence of a 
sphere of relationships in which the merely private interest 
takes precedence, in contrast with the National Socialist 
principle of the absolute, permanent and pervasive superiority 
of the general interest over the particular interest. Gemeinnutz 
qeht vor dem Eiqennutz. went one of the slogans most used by Nazi 
propaganda 119. (b) The conception of an autonomous private law 
clashes with National Socialist legal doctrine where it sees 
legal duty as duty towards an individual subject, towards an 
individual, whereas Nazi doctrine conceives the Rechtsoflicht 
essentially as a duty towards the community. (c) Finally, 
private law is criticized by Larenz as a system claiming to be 
autonomous with respect to other spheres of law, still more with 
respect to ethics and politics, whereas National Socialist 
doctrine tends to subordinate every legal sphere to principles 
of public law, and to identify these with the principles of a 
certain ethics and a certain ideology and political practice, 
namely the principles of National Socialism 120.
To explain the way in which the 
"new" Germanic law realizes the "overcoming" of the division 
between public law and private law, Larenz dwells on the 
reformulation of the figure of the contract brought about by Nazi 
dogmatics and legislation. The foundations of the system of 
private law, asserts Larenz, are private autonomy and contractual 
freedom. The few restrictions on contractual freedom present in 
traditional private law can, according to our German jurist, be 
traced back to one of the objectives assumed by this legal 
system, namely the intention to offer every individual the same 
chances of entering into a contractual relationship with another. 
It is only where these equal chances for different subjects 
cannot be brought about otherwise than by a limitation of private 
autonomy that legal regulation enters in to lay down an 
obligation to make a contract. "Wie anders heute!" exclaims our 
author with satisfaction. "How different today! In the sphere 




























































































comrades fVolksgenosseni are increasingly regulated by provisions 
of objective law instead of by contractual agreements. In the 
sphere of circulation of real property contractual regulation is 
increasingly dependent on authorization by the authorities" 121.
Even in the sphere of 
relationships left by the National Socialist order to the free 
determination of the parties, Larenz adds, contractual freedom 
is conditioned and limited by the guidelines of the economic and 
social order. However, the limits that the National Socialist 
legal order sets to contractual freedom are not aimed at bringing 
about an equal possibility for individuals to enter a contractual 
relationship, but to ease the tasks in favour of the community 
imposed on each individual. Objective law comes in to restrict 
private autonomy, in the National Socialist order, in order that 
particular tasks and functions of the community can be performed. 
"Even where the parties can still freely conclude contractual 
relationships, they must tolerate the evaluation of their 
relationships in reference to the community's needs. They must, 
for instance, accept that the price set by law will be valid 
between them instead of the agreed price, or that the power of 
termination laid down by the Civil Code or by contract - in 
respect, for instance, of rentals or the employment relationship 
- will be increasingly limited" 122.
Wolfgang Siebert takes up the 
critique of the "bourgeois" notion of contract common to Nazi 
jurists and presents Larenz's contract theory again. As far as 
the figure of the "contract" is concerned, just as for the "legal 
position” of the Volksgenosse (the figure developed to replace 
the arch-liberal subjective right), Siebert is one of the most 
attentive followers of Karl Larenz's ideas.
Firstly, and this is indicative 
of the ideological motives that animate National Socialist 
doctrine, Siebert identifies as the basis of the "bourgeois" 




























































































traditional doctrine, argues Siebert, asserts that every legal 
relationship that goes beyond the personal legal sphere of the 
subject and enters the legal sphere of another subject must in 
principle be formed by the assent of the party concerned by the 
subject's action and hence through an agreement between those 
concerned. This conception assumes that the legal spheres of all 
subjects have the same value and deserve the same protection. 
The justificatory foundation for the assertion of the need for 
agreement by those concerned in those relationships that involve 
interests going beyond the individual subjects is accordingly, 
according to Siebert, the principle of the equal dignity of human 
beings: a principle that clashes violently with the racism and 
anti-egalitarianism of Nazi ideology.
Against the liberal doctrine of 
the contract Siebert, following Larenz, raises a series of 
objections. The first, preliminary, one is that law is not, as 
positive legal theory asserts, an artificial system created by 
men, but instead a natural order consubstantial with the laws 
that govern the existence of social organisms. Law ought 
accordingly not to be regarded as the product of declarations of 
will nor conceived of as a relation between individual subjects 
123. The total legal order does not in this view result from 
individual legal relationships and is not made up of them, but 
is already in itself a "whole", a unitary and compact "organism" 
and not a sum of individual decisions and relationships. Within 
this "organism", certainly, legal relationships are constituted, 
which however presuppose that "whole" and must be functional for 
that "whole". "The system of legal relationships between folk 
comrades," writes Siebert, "rests primarily on the orders and 
natural communities within the overall order and rests so 
immediately thereupon that we may say that it is in these natural 
orders that our new law is deployed, and in the natural 





























































































The various articulations and 
legal relationships are subordinate to the ends and interests of 
the overall organism. They fulfil functions for the life of the 
organism. "To all these spheres of the whole, there is the 
common fact that within the folk order they fulfil a particular 
function and develop a system peculiar to them according to the 
type of task" 125. A functionalist theory of legal institutes 
and relationships thus takes shape, where - by contrast with what 
happens in sociological functionalism - functions are determined 
by reference not to a particular structure of society presented 
with greater or less claims to objectivity and scientific 
accuracy but to a normative model of community (the "folk 
community" modelled in accordance with the principles of National 
Socialism).
In relation to the theory of the 
contract Siebert carries out two operations: 1) he transforms the 
concept of contract "from free contract to means of forming the 
folk order" 126; 2) he restricts the sphere of application of 
the figure of the contract to the sphere of "legal circulation" 
I Rechtsverkehr). This latter operation is brought about by 
introducing the distinction between "contract" (Vertraq) and 
"legal relationship in personal law" (personenrechtliche 
Rechtsverhaltnis), a distinction that echoes the similar one made 
by Larenz between "contract" (Vertraq) and "agreement" 
(Einiqunq).
Above all, as we have said, the 
very concept of the contract is transformed. There is a denial 
of what constitutes the central nucleus of the notions of 
contract developed by the pandectists and by natural-law 
doctrine: contractual freedom. "The contract," writes Siebert, 
"is the instrument made available to the folk comrade by the 
legal system for the purpose of responsible accomplishment of his 
life relationships in the context and service of the overall 
order" 127. Private autonomy, continues Siebert, is no longer 




























































































its deployment and development. Consequently, if the contract 
is a functional relationship in the overall community order, "the 
meaning and content of this legal relationship depend in the 
first place on the overall order; determination by those 
concerned comes in only at a subsequent stage, insofar as the 
overall order requires or permits this freedom of determination" 
128.
In reality, Siebert adds, there 
has never existed any legal order allowing full contractual 
freedom. However, in the liberal order, though it bristles with 
restrictions on such freedoms, they are seen as exceptions to the 
general principle of contractual freedom. Instead, National 
Socialist legal doctrine asserts that the bounds placed on the 
contractual freedom of the individual by groups or communities
(a) are natural manifestations of the legal order and accordingly
(b) not exceptions to the postulates of this order but exceptions 
to a principle like that of contractual freedom that is radically 
rejected. This does not however mean, maintains Siebert, citing 
Larenz, that National Socialist doctrine does not recognize the 
need for and usefulness of the contract, that is, the voluntary 
participation of subjects in the maintenance and development of 
the legal order. The contract as a means for creating the folk 
order "is a necessary and valuable element in the German legal 
order, since an authentic community needs for its development the 
personal responsibility of its individual members" 129.
From this conception there follow 
a few fundamental novelties as regards the criteria and spheres 
of validity of contracts. In the first place a contract, 
according to Siebert, is invalid if the will of the parties does 
not concur "with the laws of life of the overall order", that is, 
with ideological principles but also with the more strictly 
political and practical needs (ultimately, the raison d'etat! of 
the Nazi regime. The requirement is absolute concordance and 
coincidence between those principles and these needs on the one 




























































































the contract be recognized as valid by the order. "The general 
principle that applies is that every legal transaction, 
(Rechtsqeschaft), in order to be valid, must correspond to good 
morals (den quten Sitten), that is, the fundamental laws of the 
overall folk life order" 130. However, to ascertain whether the 
parties to a contract have observed the principles of the folk 
order and hence whether the contract in question is valid, it is 
not enough, Siebert writes, to work with the simple alternative 
between validity and invalidity. The judge must instead be 
allowed a sphere of judgment and a room for intervention that is 
much broader in relation to determining the content of the 
contract and ascertaining the parties' will. The reformulation 
of the notion of contract by Siebert accordingly leads to 
assigning greater powers to the judge in assessing the 
requirements for the contract's validity.
Another major consequence of this 
theory is the introduction in particular situations of the 
obligation to contract (Kontrahierunqszwanq). National Socialist 
doctrine no longer bases this obligation, as traditional German 
doctrine had been accustomed to do, on Article 826 of the BGB 
(Schadenersatzpflicht bei vorsatzlicher und sittenwidrioer 
Schadiqunq). but on a positive duty to conclude the contract, 
seen as resulting directly from the Rechtsstellung that the 
subject has in the Volsqemeinschaft.
Siebert, like Larenz, perceives 
the contract no longer as a relationship between subjects with 
counterposed interests, but as "a community of purpose". The 
contractual relationship, on this view, is seen not as a legal 
relationship characterized by the counterposition and composition 
of differing, opposing interests of the parties, but as an 
association between associates which comes about with an eye to 
purposes and functions that are common (to the parties). From 
this community of purposes, tasks and interests of the parties 
it follows that both the parties (both creditor and debtor) have 




























































































assert rights towards the debtor and the debtor as such does not 
simply have to submit to the burden of duties to the creditor. 
The latter has as such also duties towards the debtor, and the 
debtor as such may claim rights in relation to the creditor.
This conception is of practical 
importance from the viewpoint of contractual responsibility, 
since for it the existence and scope of the obligatory bond 
between the parties are no longer determined exclusively or 
chiefly by the parties' will. This bond, writes Siebert, "starts 
instead, on certain conditions, already before conclusion of the 
contract, and does not necessarily finish at the time it is 
accomplished" 131.
In this construction an esential 
part is played by the principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben) .  
This is no longer seen as the precept of a fair balancing of the 
parties' interests and as an auxiliary principle in relation to 
the predominant one of contractual autonomy. The principle of 
"good faith" is seen as a fundamental and primary principle (in 
relation to the parties' freedom too), observance of which serves 
to measure the contracting parties' membership in the "folk 
community" and their loyalty to it. From the reformulation of 
the principle of good faith in the sense that it determines the 
suitability of the contract for its community function, Siebert 
deduces the admissibility of judicial intervention aimed at 
setting right an invalid or void contract 132.
We have seen above that Siebert 
reformulates the theory of contract through two principal 
operations: (a) the transformation of the notion of contract from 
free and autonomous agreement of the parties to Gestaltunqsmittel 
of the "folk order" (in a formula of Larenz's); (b) the 
limitation of the sphere of application of the figure of the 
contract reformed in this way to the sphere of obligatory 
property relationships, what is in German called Rechtsverkehr■ 




























































































of the category of the contract, Siebert introduces the 
distinction between "contract" and "association in personal law" 
(personenrechtliche Zusammenschluss). Siebert, in order to 
justify this distinction, starts from the finding that in the 
life of the law there are two main types of agreement between 
associates: 1) agreements aimed at the transfer or exchange of 
particular goods or individual services or the constitution of 
an obligation to such a transfer or exchange? 2) agreements aimed 
at participation in a community in personal law and its order, 
"where," Siebert adds, "this community immediately (unmittelbar) 
includes the personality of its members" 133. Entry into such 
a community is "immediate entry", that is, without mediation, 
unmittelbare Einqliederunq. and not an exchange of goods or 
services mediated by contract and by measuring the (economic) 
values at stake. But, according to Siebert, only agreements of 
type 1) can be conceived of and concluded as contracts, while 
those of type 2) are "associations in personal law".
By contrast with the contractual 
agreement, the "association in personal law" that Siebert talks 
of (coinciding in essential features with Einiqunq in Larenz's 
theory) is an "organic unit". "This sort of association comes 
about," writes Siebert, "only when folk comrades (Volksqenossen). 
on the basis of an agreement (Einiqunq) and a personal commitment 
to the service of a common national task (the performance of work 
in an enterprise, enterprise activity of the community, life in 
the matrimonial community) commit themselves to a closer, 
permanent community" 134. The community that is the object of 
the Zusammenschluss is an organic unit that by its nature already 
has its laws within it. Its regulation derives not from 
agreements between the parties (from the Zusammenschluss) but 
from its nature as a self-sufficient organism.
Siebert, like Larenz, does not 
deny the fact that entry into a community in personal law comes 
about through an act of will by the subject. However, he holds 




























































































justifies the whole legal relationship being regarded as a 
contract" 135. Instead, adds Siebert, the voluntary nature of 
the act of entry into the community is based specifically on 
incorporation into an order whose content and effects are to be 
found at a "higher" level than the one in which the parties' will 
is manifested.
The different role of the parties' 
will in the "contract" and the "association in personal law" is 
outlined by Siebert as follows: firstly, Siebert distinguishes 
between the act of entry into the legal relationship and the 
legal relationship itself. Both in the sphere of the "contract" 
and in that of the "association in personal law", the act of 
entry into the relationship is voluntary. The will of the 
individuals is not completely eliminated from the legal order. 
However, while in the "contract" the voluntary agreement of the 
parties constitutes the basis of the contractual relationship and 
creates the relationship itself, in the "association in personal 
law" precisely the opposite occurs. In the personenrechtlicher 
Zusammenschluss, writes Siebert, it is the relationship (the 
community) that is the basis for the agreement (the voluntary act 
of entry into the community). In "associations in personal law" 
the agreement presupposes the relationship and is justified 
(founded) by it. Here the agreement of the parties does not 
constitute the relationship but is instead constituted by it. 
The agreement, Siebert argues, cannot create a community that 
already exists in itself, that has a life independent of the 
parties' will.
This "overcomes" the opposition 
between private and public law. National Socialist legal 
doctrine no longer recognizes any sphere of individual life of 
associates that is not determined by the order and principles of 
the Volksaemeinschaft.




























































































To the traditional subdivision 
between public and private law (corresponding to an opposition 
"overcome" by National Socialism) Larenz counterposes a different 
articulation of the legal system. He starts by leaving out of 
the sphere of the "folk" legal system international law and 
ecclesiastical law. These, according to Larenz, do not concern 
the internal legal order of the Volksgemeinschaft. but the 
relationship of that order with other, different, legal systems 
(those of other peoples in international law, those of the 
Churches and religious sects in ecclesiastical law). 
Additionally, there are two other types of law, procedural law 
and criminal law, which, in our author's view, do not express the 
order of community law. These types of law are instead 
instrumental in relation to the community's internal order, as 
providing means to accomplish it. Procedural law serves for the 
actual affirmation of the rules of material law, for their 
application and execution, while criminal law has to do with the 
"punishment (Ahndunq) of wrong, that is, not only the external 
protection of the order but also the manifestation of its 
intimate validity and inviolability" 136.
With the field of the "internal" 
legal reality of the Volksqemeinschaft thus cleared of external 
forms (international law, ecclesiastical law) and accessory ones 
(criminal law, procedural law) of legal regulation, Larenz 
subdivides the "community" legal order into four main spheres. 
These are as follows: 1) the "political order" (in the strict 
sense); 2) the "social order"; 3) the "family order"; 4) the "law 
of the folk comrade" (das volksgenossische Recht) (in the strict 
sense) .
These four spheres are articulated 
with each other in accordance with a hierarchical order that 
places at the summit the “political order" and at the base the 
"right of the folk comrade", while the "social order" and "family 
order" are located on a footing of parity at the same 




























































































hierarchical order, the one (higher) the foundation for the other 
(lower, so that the "political order" is the foundation for the 
"social order" and the "family order", and these latter two 
orders jointly and equally are the basis for the "law of the folk 
comrade". Fundamental to all the levels, however, is the 
"political order".
As far as the "political order" 
is concerned, "its decisive character is not the use of sovereign 
power, but the task of the political integration of the people 
as a total life community (als totaler Lebensgemeinschaft) 137. 
The essence of the "political" is seen here not as the 
sovereign's decision as to the state of exception, as in Carl 
Schmitt's formula 138. Politics is seen by Larenz not as mere 
decision, still less as mere brute force. It is instead the 
"self-affirmation of a community capable of historical action" 
139, that is, more concretely, the integration of the people "as 
a whole that wills and acts in unitary fashion" 140. This 
integration is brought about through the work of leadership 
(Fuhrunq), through education and organization from above of the 
people, and through its own commitment, that is, through 
participation by the masses. "The political integration of our 
people," writes Larenz, "is brought about through the use of the 
party, its articulations, the State and the army IWehrmacht)" 
141.
We must emphasize the novelty and 
importance of the cocneption of the "political" developed by 
Larenz. It in fact deliberately expresses the specific character 
of the totalitarian State, tracing the line of demarcation 
between this new State form and traditional despotic regimes. 
The end of politics in National Socialist doctrine and practice 
is not so much rule over the German people, as its "integration". 
(This is not the case, however, with National Socialist policy 
towards peoples different from Germans, the Artfremden: towards 
these. National Socialist policy is pure deployment of force 




























































































to make the German people (passively) tolerate the operations of 
political power but to secure the people's (active) contribution 
to those operations. For the totalitarian State (of which the 
Nazi State is a paradigmatic example) the point is not to 
"oppress" or "exploit" the people, but to "create" it, to make 
it an entity in its own image and likeness. While the 
traditional despotic regime programmatically intends to dig a 
deeper ditch between the dimension of society and the sphere of 
political power, the totalitarian regime cherishes the ambition 
to fill in that ditch and to confuse it and combine it with the 
social dimension. Totalitarian State means not so much a State 
that has all power, as a State that has extended its boundaries 
to the whole society, a total State 143.
From the diversity of the ends 
pursued by the despotic regime and the totalitarian one 
respectively there follows a different relationship of the two 
regimes with individuals and the masses. The despotic regime, 
in order to accomplish its ends, has no need of the active 
involvement of the masses. The totalitarian regime by contrast 
cannot do without it. Inasmuch as the National Socialist regime 
has the ambition to "create", to "remodel", the people, to free 
it from "impure" elements, to regenerate it and to make it a 
driving element for its expansionism, it cannot operate purely 
by repressive means but must also be capable of gaining and 
mobilizing the consent of the (German) people. The typical 
feature of the politics of the totalitarian State, in particular 
the National Socialist State, is well put in Karl Larenz's 
conception of the "political”: it is "total mobilization" 144.
The fundamental principles of the 
"political" order in the strict sense - the first and fundamental 
sphere of the four into which Larenz subdivides the "new" legal 
system - are two: 1) Fuhrunq (that is, the absolute power of the 
Führer) and 2) Gefolqschaftstreu (that is, loyalty and absolute 
obedience to the directives coming from the leader). These two 




























































































"political order" in the strict sense, but also the "social 
order", the "family order" and the "law of the folk comrade" in 
the strict sense. To be sure, writes Larenz, the whole of law 
is a "political order" in the broad sense, as being pervaded by 
the general principles of Fuhrunq and of Gefolqschaftstreu. 
However it is, he continues, appropriate to distinguish, from the 
overall order of the Volksqeminschaft (as "political order" in 
the broad sense) the Fuhrungsordnunq of the Reich. the 
organization of the party (the NSDAP), the Wehrmacht. the State 
and the communes (as "political order" in the strict sense).
The "social order" regulates the 
working and occupational life of the Volksqenosse. and in 
connection with it the administration of the territory and the 
organization of the economy 145. The "social order" thus 
includes labour law in the broad sense, the organization of 
professional associations, agrarian and planning law, market 
regulation and the general organization of the economy. In the 
sphere of "social order", there operate together the production 
of law by the authorities and that by the individual "folk 
comrade". "The legal position (Rechtsstellunq) in the social 
order as a rule includes both community tasks and duties towards 
the community, as well as rights and duties towards the folk 
comrades. The decisive criterion for assessment is social or 
professional honour. This requires both professional performance 
and the fulfilment of the community tasks founded in the social 
legal position and duty of loyalty within the framework of a 
closer community relationship, for instance that of the 
enterprise community" 146. The violation of social honour, of 
the "farmer" or "professional" for instance, may be punished 
(qeahndet). within the sphere of the "social organization", 
through de-recognition of the legal position, as farmer or as 
entrepreneur, say, or through loss of job or even expulsion from 
the occupation association, that is, a measure amounting to a bar 
on continuing the occupational activity hitherto carried out, 
aimed at those who have been guilty of a violation. Larenz 




























































































the regulation included within "social order" solely as "law of 
the estates" (standisches Recht) or corporative law. Instead, 
in his view, what is present in respect of labour and enetrprise 
law, agrarian and town planning law, law of the economy and of 
industry, is in the main law "of the whole people", 
qesamtvblkisches Recht. and hence not special law (Sonderrecht) 
but ordinary law (Gemeinrecht).
"The family," writes Larenz, "is, 
alongside the folk community and as a fundamental cell of it, the 
only community founded upon a bond of blood" 147. The 
individual is born in the family as he is in his people. By 
comparison with the family and the folk, all the other 
"communities", like the "estate" and even the State, are regarded 
as artificial organisms. This does not mean, says Larenz, that 
they are based on some type of contract. Family law is 
accordingly not to be inserted either into law of the "social 
order" nor "law of the folk comrade" in the strict sense. Family 
relationships are seen here not as economic or professional 
relationships nor as contractual relationships or something 
similar. The category of contract within the sphere of the 
family order is made to play an entirely subordinate role. It 
cannot be said, maintains Larenz, repeating Hegel's verdict 148, 
that marriage constitutes a contract, save by committing an 
"infamy" (eine Schandlichkeit) 149. This is also true in 
relation to adoption. This too, according to Larenz, cannot be 
treated legally as a "contract" 150.
It is more correct, Larenz 
maintains, to assert that as far as the legal pattern and 
dogmatic presentation of matrimony and adoption is concerned, 
what we have are "agreements" (Einiqunqen), "since the expression 
'contract' alludes to a contractual relationship, not to the 
foundation of a community relationship eines 
Gemeinschaftsverhaltnisses), which is constructed on personal 
loyalty and dedication, on care and submission, and not upon 




























































































The formal, "universal abstract", 
concept of contract adopted by traditional legal dogmatics brings 
with it, according to Larenz, the fact that the legal provisions 
contained in the codes, in particular the BGB, are applied to the 
most diverse cases - as long as nothing else is provided for by 
law - even where those cases had not been foreseen nor considered 
by the legislator. The provisions on contract contained in the 
BGB were, Larenz argues, elaborated and issued in terms of real 
and obligatory relationships, that is, in terms of so-called 
legal circulation, Rechtsverkehr■ He accordingly sees them as 
not suited for founding a "community relationship", like an 
employment relationship, a betrothal, or matrimony. Larenz 
accordingly proposes to confine the applicability and 
operationality of the figure of the contract solely to the sphere 
of "legal circulation", which, as we shall see below, constitutes 
"the law of the Volksgenosse in the strict sense" 152.
Matrimony, in Larenz's doctrine, 
constitutes a "closer community" within the sphere of the "folk 
community", an articulation of the Volksqemeinschaft. Just as 
the latter is seen as a natural organism endowed with a life of 
its own, not produced by agreement of its members but instead 
generating these from its innards, similarly matrimony is 
regarded not as a human creation, the result of the agreement of 
the spouses and their wish to live together, but similarly seen 
as a natural reality independent of the will of its "members", 
a "whole" which is more than the sum of its "parts" 153. 
Moreover, matrimony, being an "articulation" of the 
Volksqemeinschaft, cannot be contracted by any man with any 
woman, but only among members of the same race or kindred races. 
"True matrimony is accordingly not conceivable between any 
individuals whatever, but only between those belonging to related 
races, meeting the minimum biological requirements" 154.
From the theory of matrimony as 
natural "community" derives the assertion of its indissolubility. 
What man has not made, man cannot put asunder. "He who concludes 




























































































bond which certainly cannot be dissolved even with the assent of 
the other, not even at the cost of renouncing a son. The law of 
divorce must make clear to all that contracting matrimony is at 
a different level from concluding a contract; that matrimony, 
apart from exceptional cases to be regarded as misfortune 
(Ungluck), is indissoluble, and its survival does not depend 
solely on the parties' will" 155. Matrimony is thus conceived 
as a union that is as a rule indissoluble, except for a few cases 
in which the breakdown of the communal life between the spouses 
is very severe and irreparable, what Larenz calls "the incurable 
ruin of the marriage". The incurability of this ruin is to be 
ascertained irrespective of the possible blame of one or both 
spouses, and is consequently to be left up to the judge, even 
simply at the request of the public prosecutor against the will 
of the spouses themselves 156.
The "family order", though 
regarded as a "natural community", is nonetheless subordinate to 
the "political order" in the strict sense. This emerges clearly, 
writes Larenz, both at the point of concluding matrimony and at 
that of dissolving it. For both these aspects, argues Larenz, 
require in order to come about the intervention of the State 
authorities. Moreover, the "national political" significance of 
matrimony is claimed to be manifest in the legislation on the 
impediements to the conclusion of matrimony, aimed at 
safeguarding the "purity" of German blood and guaranteeing race 
hygiene, and in the provisions on the grounds justifying the 
dissolution of marriage 157. "Marriage and the family are 
fundamental aspects of the overall constitution of the folk: 
their further perfecting cannot therefore come about 
independently of the political order" 158.
Moreover, as regards property 
relations between the spouses and the right of inheritance, the 
"family order" includes a sphere related to property law and the 
law of obligations. The relationship between family law on the 




























































































sanctioned in liberal codes and in particular the German Civil 
Code, the BGB, is overturned in National Socialist legal 
doctrine. While in the German Civil Code the foundations of 
property law of the family are to be found in the provisions of 
the so-called "general part", "we", writes Larenz, "must 
precisely to the contrary see in the construction of the family 
one of the foundations - the second alongside the social order - 
of the property-law relationships of the individual folk 
comrade" 159. In a new future "people's code" (Volksqesetzbuchl 
accordingly, there will in his view be a need to deal with family 
law, at least in essential features, before relationships of 
obligation.
The "law of the folk comrade" (das 
volksqenossische Recht) in the strict sense includes the property 
and contractual relationships of the individual Volksqenosse as 
such, and not as member of a particular estate, a particular 
occupation or class or family, that is, a narrower "community". 
The individual here appears as a bearer of a life sphere of his 
own ("als Traqer eines eiqenen Lebensbereichs" 160), and also 
as a participant (Teilnehmer) in legal exchanges. The means made 
available to the individual by the order tor such participation 
and for the co-management or co-production (Mitqestaltunq) of 
this sphere of life is the contract. The obligation towards the 
other party, called by Larenz the "comrade in contract" 
(Vertraqsqenosse). is realized in contractual responsibility. 
Alongside this, there is place also for extra-contractual 
repsonsibility aimed at defending the individual from attacks 
against his "life sphere" coming from third parties, subjects who 
are not his Vertraqsqenossen.
The fundamental institutions of 
the "law of the individual Volksqenosse" in this view are: 
property (as principal type of "real right"), the contract (as 
principle type of "legal transaction") and contractual and extra- 
contractual responsibility. Larenz defines this order as law of 




























































































broad sense all four spheres in the quadripartition developed by 
Larenz constitute the law of the member of the 
Volksoemeinschaft. the Volksqenosse■ Every regulation of the 
"new" order concerns the life and interests of the individual, 
and is accordingly volksqenossisches Recht in the broad sense. 
The law of the Volksqenosse in the narrow sense is, however, only 
that which takes into consideration the individual as such, 
divested of his various qualifications as "member" of this or 
that articulation of the "community" (family, estate, locality, 
party organization etc.).
"The law of the folk comrade (in 
the narrow sense) is not," writes Larenz, "an autonomus legal 
sphere as private law has been to date; instead its bases are 
determined decisively by the social order and by the family 
order" 161. Thus, property in its various manifestations (for 
instance as ownership of the hereditary farm, the Erbhof 162, 
of a piece of agricultural or urban land, of raw materials or of 
consumer goods) takes into itself definite bonds and duties 
resulting respectively from the differing types of things that 
are the object of the property, from the actual destination of 
the thing and from its value to the "community". This is true 
mutatis mutandis for contractual freedom too. "This in general 
exists today," asserts Larenz, "only as long as the overall 
social and economic order leaves it a space, and may be exercised 
even irrespective of particular provisions of law only in 
accordance with the duties that result for the indidivual from 
his social tasks and responsibility" 163.
To illustrate his conception of 
contractual autonomy as the social function performed by the 
individual, Larenz gives an example. Suppose, he writes, that 
in a village there is only one seller of groceries, and he 
refuses to sell his goods to a particular individual. In such 
a case the latter could according to the provisions contained in 
the BGB and the traditional conception of contractual 




























































































of compensation for damage (within the meaning of Article 826 
BGB). Larenz instead considers that it is possible, starting 
from the idea that private autonomy is conditioned by the social 
function of its bearer, to lay down an obligation on the 
shopkeeper to sell his goods to whoever asks to buy them, 
assuming that he is the sole seller of groceries in that 
particular territory. The fact that the shopkeeper for certain 
necessary goods is the only one in a particular area objectively 
attributes to him, according to Larenz, the function (and hence 
the duty) to provide for the supply of those goods to all the 
inhabitants of the territory.
The distinctive character of the 
"law of the folk comrade" in the strict sense lies not so much, 
Larenz asserts, in the fact that it is valid for every "folk 
comrade", since the discipline of the "political order" too 
applies to every member of the Volksqemeinschaft■ The 
distinctive feature of the "law of the Volksqenosse" instead is 
that it includes those legal relationships of individuals among 
themselves that are not founded on their "positions as member" 
(Gliedstellunqen). that is, on their Rechtsstellunqen based on 
belonging to a family, a firm, a geographical place, corporations 
or the political articulations of the State or the party. The 
"law of the folk comrade" in the strict sense disciplines the 
relationships of the individual as such, irrespective of his 
"legal position" as "position as member" in the community. It 
is what remains in the National Socialist legal order of the 
"old" private law, the part of it that the Nazi jurists consider 
they have to maintain in order to allow the functioning of trade 
and exchange.
Given the quadripartition of the 
law into "political order" (in the strict sense), "social order", 
"family order" and "law of the folk comrade" (in the strict 
sense) as alternative to the division between public law and 
private law, Larenz is concerned to establish a principle of 




























































































each other. "A subdivision of the legal order into spheres 
organically linked with each other," writes our German jurist, 
"indeed overcomes the separation and laceration that the 
opposition between public law and private law involves, but does 
not yet guarantee the unity of the law as an order of national 
life over and above any articulation of it" 164.
The unity of the National 
Socialist legal order, articulated and fragmented into four 
distinct spheres, cannot be that offered by, for instance, the 
Grundnorm of Kelsen's doctrine. The "fundamental norm", in fact, 
is ill-adapted to a doctrine like the National Socialist which 
requires absolute and material (ideological) foundations of 
validity, regarded as objective and not merely "assumed", or to 
a legal and political organization - like the Fiihrerstaat - which 
is not content with formal expedients to assert the validity and 
concatenation of its own norms. Moreover, as Norberto Bobbio has 
maintained 165, the theory of the Stufenbau and in particular 
the placing at its summit of the Grundnorm 166are in a certain 
sense the translation at the level of theory of the structure of 
law of the ancient ideal of the rule of law, or of the prevalence 
of the law over political power (over the government of men). 
National Socialist political and legal theory goes in the 
opposite direction, culminating in exhaltation of the Fiihrer's 
will to power.
Nazi legal doctrine combines 
voluntarism and organicism, giving rise to a mixture in which 
voluntarism plays the part of a "constitutional doctrine", and 
organicism has the function of justifying or giving an absolute 
foundation for it and at the same time ideologically concealing 
the exaggerated voluntarism of the "constitutional doctrine". 
Voluntarism has in a certain sense descriptive value for the Nazi 
political regime as it is in reality, while organicism is 
entirely prescriptive (though it claims to be a descriptive 
theory of legal reality) and evokes a mythical need to be of a 




























































































in the theological precept ut omnes unum sint. Organicism then 
performs an important ideological function in the framework of 
the total State. The National Socialist regime is not only a 
regime upheld by a sovereign will that is above the law, it is 
also a totalitarian regime that needs the support of the masses. 
The mystique of the Volksqemeinschaft and the organicist 
conception of law as "life order" also serve this purpose, of 
mobilizing the masses around the decisions of the leader, the 
Führer, the "egocrat" 167.
The unity of the legal order in 
its multiple subdivisions is assured, in Larenz's doctrine, by 
the "unity" of the idea of law (Rechtsidee), which inspires both 
the "political order" (in the strict sense) and the "social 
order" and family order, and the "law of the individual 
Volksqenosse" (in the strict sense). "Our law, over and above 
the necessary articulations and despite some widespread 
contradictions," writes Larenz, "constitutes and must constitute, 
nonetheless, an internal unity, in virtue of the unitariness of 
the idea of law which in the last analysis is at its foundation" 
168. This "idea of law" is connected in our Nazi jurist's 
conception with the "being" and "nature" of the German race and 
people. "This unity," he writes, "is both an expression and a 
pledge of the unity and totality of our national being" 169.
The "idea of law" of which Karl 
Larenz speaks so much, which supposedly ensures the unity of the 
"folk" legal order, is overloaded with ethical, political and 
ideological elements and accordingly differs from the purely 
formal "idea of law" in neo-Kantian philosophy, of Stammler, say 
170. "This idea of law," writes Larenz, "is not a merely formal 
principle but a principle that creates the content: the principle 
of community." 171
Larenz's Rechtsidee perfectly 
coincides with the conception that National Socialism has of law. 




























































































law, and the one between individual and community underlying it, 
"overcome", bases as they are of the legal model of the liberal 
State, but the other great division that liberalism sought to 
realize in the sphere of the organization of society is also 
overthrown: the one beteen ethics and politics on the one hand 
and law on the other 172. From the confusion of law and 
politics here, it is certainly not law that comes off best. It 
is politics that becomes omni-comprehensive, a totalizing 
dimension that absorbs every other sphere of human action. In 
the National Socialist regime and in its legal doctrine there is 
no longer any space of social life that is not seen as of 
relevance to politics 173.
6. Total State and legal subjectivity
In the "new" "folk" (or 
"national") order, the law does not have the function of limiting 
the sphere of freedom of the individual, since this would 
presuppose the existence of an autonomous individual, of a free 
sphere of action for him, which would lie outside the community 
and the State law. According to Larenz, on the contrary, "the 
liberty of the whole contains also the liberty of the 
individual"; the individual is not conceivable except as a 
product, part, appendix, of the community. Freedom "is due the 
individual not as an individual outside the community, but only 
in the community and through the community" 174. The .law 
accordingly does not have the function of limiting an individual 
freedom that precedes it, but of conceding and creating a freedom 
that finds in the law (the community order) its source, its 
instrument and its end.
In Larenz's doctine the community 
and the State (which is a direct emanation of the community) 
precede the freedom and the sphere of autonomy of the individual. 
The "whole" of the community pre-exists the peculiarities of the 
individual living beings and naturally absorbs them. This 




























































































Socialism. "The priority and primacy of all its "members 
(parts)", Herbert Marcuse writes in this connection, "is a 
fundamental thesis of heroic popular realism. The whole is 
understood not simply as a sum or an abstract totality, but as 
the unity that unifies the parts, a unity that is the prior 
condition for the realization and completion of each part. The 
demand for the realization of this totality occupies the foremost 
place in the programmatic proclamations of the total autoritarian 
State" 175.
"Civil society", as the sphere of 
the "particular", the area in which relationships between 
individuals take place, is, in Larenz's thought, absolutely 
subordinate to the State, understood as the collective dimension 
par excellence, the sphere of the "universal", and hence as the 
"concretization" of the Volksqemeinschaft. This differs from 
what is the case in Marx's thought; as we know, he had intended 
to turn Hegel's original scheme of the relationship between State 
and "civil society" upside down 176. "Civil society", or even 
in Larenz's terminology Gesellschaft (in opposition to the 
"community", to the Gemeinschaft) is further seen as something 
"relatively dead", as being produced by alienation and the 
crystallization of community life. "Society (Gesellschaft)." 
writes Larenz, "is in fact the dialectical opposite of community 
(Gemeinschaft) and may very well be characterized in relation to 
it as something relatively dead, which in the complex of life 
must nonetheless fulfil its own function, limited and subordinate 
though it be" 177.
However, even in the most despotic 
and totalitarian of regimes, some minimum freedom must be 
acknowledged to the individual. Certainly, the ideal for those 
regimes would be to be able to get rid entirely of this 
embarrassing presence and convert the community and the law from 
a mere representation of a system or mythical organism into the 
reality of such a being. This is obviously impossible. That 




























































































through and connecting a variety of imperativist and statist 
conceptions of law. The monstrous being evoked by the mystique 
of the community “whole" in Larer.z is already sketched on the 
cover of the first edition of Hobbes's Leviathan■ The prevailing 
legal dogmatics, in particular in Germany, as from the second 
half of the last century seeks to efface the individual's 
materiality and drive out the category of subjective right from 
its majestic doctrinal systematizations. Kelsen finally 
proclaims the "reduction of subjective right to objective right" 
178; Larenz, in the conclusion to his Gemeinschaft und 
Rechtsstellunq, writes "thus, the opposition between subjective 
right and objective right is overcome" 179.
The strange and paradoxical 
contiguity between Kelsen's extreme legal positivism and the 
theories of National Socialism on the point of the dogmatic 
construction of legal subjectivity was pointed out just when the 
two theories were being clarified (the early 30s for both) by a 
scholar who can certainly not be suspected of sympathy for 
National Socialism or antipathy to Kelsen: Renato Treves. In a 
courageous article aimed at disputing the pretended Hegelian 
derivation of Nazi doctrine, noting among other things, with some 
regret, the rise of irrationalism in German culture and the 
adherence to National Socialism of thinkers thitherto loyal to 
the ideals of reason and the rule of law, Treves notes in passing 
the analogies between the theses on subjective right and the 
prevalence of public right in Kelsen and the theories of Nazi 
jurists in this connection. "In the critiques of individualist 
formalism," writes Treves, "in the affirmation of the superiority 
of public law over private law, of objective right over 
subjective right and in all those other points of contact with 
Hegelianism we have seen already mentioned by Schmitt and Huber, 
the impossibility becomes entirely clear of picking out an 
intrinsic, substantive connection, because obviously these 
principles are not characteristic of the two conceptions but very 
widespread even in differing and indeed clearly opposite 




























































































which is fiercely opposed by the writers of the new Germany 
although it maintains the very same principles of reduction of 
private law to public law and of subjective right to objective 
right which, according to those writers, ought to lie at the 
basis of the renewed German legal science" 180.
The procedure whereby Larenz's 
organicist theory on the one hand and legal positivist formalism, 
in particular Kelsen's "pure theory", on the other, deconstruct 
the figure of the legal subject is certainly different. Legal 
formalism places the law at such a level of abstraction that the 
materiality, or humanity, of the subject, and his unity, dissolve 
into a series of formal relationships of which he (the subject) 
represents the point of imputation for each. The subject is thus 
made to evaporate by the formalists, especially by Kelsen; it is 
no longer, on this view, anything but a myriad of points of 
reference for the individual norms. Kelsen, that is, reduces the 
legal subject from the assumed unity of the order and therefore 
possible reference point for every norm to the point of 
imputation of the individual norm.
Legal subjectivity is not elimated 
by Kelsen, but confined within the sphere of the individual 
normative relationship. There is no longer, according to Kelsen, 
a legal subject in the sphere of the order, and hence a legal 
quality of subject, but a subject of the individual normative 
relationship, the point of reference for the individual norm. 
The legal subject, in the pure doctrine, is not assumed or 
"found" by the legal order, but created by it, because the norm 
requires a point of reference 181. The unity of the human 
person is deconstructed into a myriad of reference points 182. 
What seemed indivisible, namely the individual 183, that which 
constituted the ultimate element in liberal legal orders, is 
decomposed by Kelsen into ever tinier, simpler elements, into so 
many "points" of reference for the norm. This is a realization, 
as Kelsen himself recognizes, of an ancient dream of legal 




























































































complete satisfaction for the old requirement of positivist legal 
theory: namely to conceive the physical person and the legal 
person as essentially identical. The 'physical person' is not 
man as maintained by the traditional doctrine. Man is not a 
legal concept but a biological and psychological one, and does 
not express any unity given by the law or by the knowledge of 
law, because the law does not embrace man in his totality with 
all his spiritual and bodily functions, but treats as obligations 
or authorizations only well-delimited human acts" 184.
Larenz proceeds differently. The 
human person as legal subject is no longer made to evaporate into 
a normative atmosphere (where the norms are the only entities 
endowed with meaning and existence), but - in Larenz's organicist 
conception - dipped in and corroded away by the different 
situations of social life, treated in each of them as a 
particular subject (as a "member" of a "narrower community" (and 
hence subject to a special law. As Franz Wieacker, another 
National Socialist theoretician, wrote: "The citizen or member 
of the State to whom the civil codes of the early 19th century 
are addressed has become an abstraction that is today replaced 
by the equally universal but non-abstract concept of the folk 
comrade (Volksqenosse), who according to subsequent specification 
may be sometimes a worker, sometimes the head of a firm, 
sometimes a farmer, sometimes an employee or a soldier" 185. 
According to Larenz and National Socialist doctrine, denying the 
"universal abstract concept" of the human being, the subject is 
not the ordering centre of the various legal positions. The 
"farmer", for instance, as legal subject is in this view not 
commensurable with nor equatable with the "tenant", the "soldier" 
or the "employee". These social descriptions are not regarded 
as subsequent specifications of a previous quality of being a 
subject or a person but are so many original forms of 
subjectivity.
Thus while in Kelsen's "pure 




























































































deconstructed through formalizing abstractions, in Larenz's 
theory by contrast this comes about through the fragementation 
and extreme relativization of the quality of being a subject. 
This is no longer linked to human nature (which, as being a 
"universal abstract concept" is denied), but to the Bedinqtheit. 
to the "relativity", of the specific situations of social life 
there corresponds a distinct legal subject. While Kelsen posits, 
in place of the concept of the human person, the formal notion 
of "point of reference", Larenz replaces the traditional concept 
of legal subject by a notion of a sociological character: the 
role that a certain individual plays in a contingent social 
situation. The sociological viewpoint is here assumed in order 
to nullify the individuality and uniqueness of the human subject 
and identify him entirely with the group in which he acts: "From 
the sociological viewpoint," writes Franz Wieacker as a Nazi 
jurist, "there is no conduct of a group of folk comrades as 
citizens" 186.
The attempt to efface the 
autonomous subject from the legal system is however condemned to 
encounter the reality of the facts: it is not the human being 
that is the product of law, but on the contrary, unfortunately 
for jurists who might otherwise believe themselves to be at the 
centre of the world, it is the law that is a product of man. And 
man in turn is not an abstract entity, cannot even in the 
rarified atmosphere of a legal system be reduced to a "point of 
reference", a "role", a "function", a "system" among so many 
others, but is always the separate person, the individual. Thus 
even Larenz, despite his radical anti-individualism, is compelled 
to acknowledge that "National Socialism cannot. nor wishes to, 
do without the collaboration of the acting personality, 
independent and responsible, of the community member in economic 
and legal transactions" 187.
The Nazi regime, too, "cannot, nor 
wishes to" eliminate individual autonomy entirely. Here there 




























































































positivism. Nor would there be with the most liberal and 
flexible of legal systems. The difference consists not so much 
in acknowledging the impossibility of doing without the 
individual as in (a) the limits within which this necessity is 
recognized and (b) the status attributed to that sphere (even if 
very limited) . In Nazi doctrine, by comparison with legal 
positivist theories, (i) the sphere within which individual 
autonomy or the individual's independent action is recognized is 
very restricted; (ii) the status attributed to this sphere is 
very impoverished.
In legal positivist theories the 
sphere of individual autonomy, even if minimal, is guaranteed by 
a series of formal mechanisms that take concrete shape in the 
principle of strict legality, and by the images underlying these 
mechanisms, in particular the material concept of law (what Franz 
Neumann and Friedrich von Hayek define as "law in the material 
sense" 188), images that centre round the moral and social 
dignity of the autonomous human person. "The material law," 
writes Franz Neumann, "is... defined as the type of State norm 
that can be linked to definite ethical postulates, irrspective 
of whether these are postulates of justice, liberty, equality or 
whatever. This meaning of law is in constituent relationship 
with the cocnept of law as norm: the essence of the norms is the 
rational principle (logos) that is represented in them" 189.
In National Socialism, which had 
got rid of the material concept of law (in the sense in which 
this term is used by Franz Neumann and by von Hayek) and in which 
the collective imagination turned around the figure of a mythical 
community organism, compact and homogeneous, the margins of the 
sphere of autonomous individual action are "relative" 190. 
These are, that is, insecure, uncertain, since their extent 
depends entirely on the needs and requirements of the "folk 
community", the needs of an entity that can never be reduced to 
the individuals who are "inserted" or "incorporated" in it 




























































































considered, from everything that until the 17th century used to 
be called ratio reqni. the "reason of State".
In National Socialism, Larenz 
maintains, the contract means not the activation of transactional 
freedom of action for the individual that is in principle 
unlimited and only exceptionally made subject to certain 
limitations, but the activation of a freedom of determination 
( Bestimmunqsfreiheit1 that is granted to the members of the 
community within the sphere of the general order and is more or 
less broad according to the needs of the life of the folk, a 
liberty that can never be exercised save in accord with the "folk 
order" 191. This residual Bestimmunqsfreiheit is very fragile, 
"relative" in fact, because it may at any moment be reduced or 
wiped out, in accordance with the requirements of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, or by whoever, on the basis of this mythical 
"organism", holds actual political power, and is in that case "he 
who decides on the state of exception" 192.
1. In this effort, the jurists combined in the Kiel University 
law faculty distinguished themselves. This faculty was advised 
for students throughout Germany, being regarded by the Nazi 
leaders as a political Stosstrupp. Larenz was full professor 
there. In this connection see P.Thoss, Das subjektive Recht der 
qliedschaftlichen Bindung. Zum Verhaltnis von Nationalsozialismus 
und Privatrecht. Europaische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main 
1968, p.12, and esp. E.Dohring, Geschichte der Juristischen 
Fakultat 1665-1965, in AA . W . , Geschichte der Christian Albrechts 
- Universitàt Kiel 1665-1965. voi. 3, part 1, K.Wachholtz, 
Neumiinster 1965, p.201ff.
2. On this "prime dichotomy" see N.Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla 
funzione. Nuovi studi di teoria del diritto. Comunità, Milan 
1977, p.148ff.
3. "The struggle against the present central significance of 
'subjective right'" is hoped for by Larenz in Neubau des 
Privatrechts■ in "Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis", No.145, 
1939, p.107
4. A discordant voice in this connection comes from Frantisek 
Weyr, even though he is a thinker operating in the sphere of the 




























































































Problem eines einheitlichen Rechtssystems. in "Archiv für 
offentliches Recht". XXXII, 4, p.563.
5. To Larenz's doctrine one might apply what Gioele Solari 
writes in connection with Auguste Comte's thought: "For Comte, 
the a priori is not the freedom of the individual, which is an 
abstraction, but the freedom of the individual within the whole, 
which is concrete. Accordingly, his system of rights and 
obligations aims not so much at the equal co-existence of liberty 
as at the subordination of liberties, or of right, to the 
totality" (G.Solari, Positivismo giuridico e politico di Auguste 
Comte. now in G.Solari, La filosofia politica. vol.II, Da Kant 
a Comte, edited by L.Firpo, Laterza, Rome-Bari 1974, p.329). 
There are those who maintain that Comte's thought is at the 
origin of the Fascist ideology of Action Française. This is the 
opinion of, for instance, Julien Benda: "In France the true 
theoreticians of the State as negating the individual - the true 
fathers of the clerics who have betrayed the country - are Bonald 
... and the author of the Catéchisme positiviste" (J.Benda, La 
trahison des clercs, Italian translation by S.Teroni Menzella, 
2nd ed., Einaudi, Turin 1976, p.19). On the collectivist nature 
of Nazi ideology cf. Thomas Mann, Das Problem der Freiheit. 
Bermann-Fischer, Stockholm 1939, p.28ff.
6. See L .Duguit, Les transformations générales du droit privé 
depuis le code Napoléon. Felix Alcan, Paris 1912. On Duguit's 
critique of the notion of subjective right and the link between 
this criticism and Durkheim's functionalism, see H.Coing, Zur 
geschichte des Begriffs "Subiektives Recht". now in H.Coing, 
Gesammelte Aufsatze zu Rechtsgeschichte. Rechtsphilosophie und 
Zivilrecht, V.Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p.259-260. 
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von.K.Larenz, Erster Band, W.Kohlhammer, Stuttgart and Berlin 
1943, p.l77ff.
173. Referring to Hegel's juvenile writings, Larenz conceives
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sense, as an organism that embraces all the aspects of human 
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Die Bedeutunq der volkischen Sitte in Heqels Staatsphilosophie, 
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the propaganda of the ruling party, nor any moral code that was 
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Osterlow and F.Cerutti, Einaudi, Turin 1969, p.20.
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177. K.Larenz, review of G.K.Schmelzeisen, Deutsches Recht.
Einführunq in die Rechtswissenschaft (Leipzig 1938), in "Archiv 
für die civilistische Praxis", voi.145, 1939, pp.252-253. My
emphasis.
178. Cf. H.Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto. 
Itaian trans, by R.Treves from the first edition of the Reine 
Rechtslehre (F.Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna 1934), op.cit. . p.83.
179. K.Larenz, Gemeinschaft und Rechtsstelluna. op.cit.. p.39.
180. R.Treves, La filosofia di Hegel e le nuove concezioni
tedesche del diritto e dello stato, in "Annali dell'Istituto di 
scienze giuridiche, economiche, politiche e sociali 
dell'Università di Messina", voi.Vili, 1934-35, Principato, 
Messina 1935, p.304. Cf. also R.Treves, Il diritto come
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dell'Istituto giuridico dell'Università di Torino, Turin 1934,
p.122.
181. On this see A.Falzea, Capacità, op.cit., p.92.
182. Cf. H.Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto. 
op.cit.. p.87ff.
183. Cf. the first chapter in N.Luhmann, Liebe als Passion. Zur 
Codierung von Intimitât, 4th ed., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
1984, p.13ff.
184. H.Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto, op.cit.. 
p. 87.
185. F.Wieacker, Per Staand der Rechtserneuerunq auf dem Gebiete 
des bürgerlichen Rechts, op.cit.. p.ll.
186. Ibid.
187. K.Larenz, Vertrag und Unrecht. Part 1: Vertrau und
Vertraqsbruch. op.cit.. p.36, my emphasis. Still more explicit 
in this sense, and accordingly implicitly critical towards 
Larenz's communitaristic and objectivistic radicalism, is Julius 
Binder. "The will of the community," he writes, "can become real 
only as will of the individual. The will can become real only 
as action (Handlung): a will that does not become action is not 
will. And actions are always only possible as activities
(Betàtigungen) of the individual and of his individual will" 
(J.Binder, Die Bedeutunq der Rechtsphilosophie für die Erneuerunq 
des Privatsrecht. in AA.W., Zur Erneuerunq des Bürgerlichen 
Rechts. C.H.Beck, Munich and Berlin n.d. (but 1938), p.28).
188. Cf, F,Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes. Eine 
Untersuchnunq zum Verhâltnis von politischer Theorie und 
Rechtssvstem in der Konkurrenzqesellschaft. German trans, by A. 
Sollner, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1980, pp.68-71, and F.A. von 
Hayek, Die Verfassunq der Freiheit. J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 




























































































189. F,Neumann, op.cit., p.69.
190. Larenz talks of "relative independence (relative 
Selbstândiakeit) of the individual in relation to the whole" 
(K.Larenz, Deutsche Rechtseuerunq und Rechtsphilosophie, op.cit., 
p.44, my emphasis) and of "relativity (Relativitat) of freedom 
of determination (Bestimmunqsfreiheit)" (K.Larenz, Die Wandlunq 
des Vertraasbeqriffs, op.cit., p.491, my emphasis). See also
K.Larenz, Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der Geqenwart, 2nd ed., 
Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1935, p.157, note 6.
191. K.Larenz, Die Wandlunq des Vertraqsbeqriffs, op.cit., 
p.491, my emphasis.
192. The formula is, as we know, the one used by Karl Schmitt 
to define the "sovereign" (cf. C.Schmitt, Politische Théologie, 
op.cit., p.ll). This formula however, contrary to what its 
author says, does not, in my view, have a descriptive nature (of 
power as it is), but a prescriptive one (of power as it ought to 
be). It indicated, at the time it was formulated (the first 
edition of Politische Théologie is from 1922) not the reality of 
political power in the Weimar Republic to which it was supposed 
to apply, but more the ideal of a political power finally aware 
of its role (of its role according to Schmitt, clearly) which was 
still waiting to come into being. It was only with the advent 
of Hitler that this formula assumed some descriptive character 
(in relation to the National Socialist regime), which it retains 
for occupation regimes, for military dictatorships and partially 
for totalitarian systems, or for all those regimes that Ferenc 
Fehér would define as "political societies" (cf. F.Fehér, Le 
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